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“In [a wrongful death action], damages may be awarded that, under all 
the circumstances of the case, may be just . . . .”1 
- California Legislature 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Measuring the value of a human life is no easy matter.  Courts have 
been struggling with this difficult task since before wrongful death was 
even an actionable wrong.2  More recently, Judge Richard Posner consid-
ered this issue in Arpin v. United States.3  In Arpin, the plaintiff brought a 
wrongful death action arising from alleged medical malpractice for the 
death of her husband.4  After a bench trial, the district judge awarded the 
plaintiff damages in excess of $8 million, consisting of some $500,000 for 
medical care and lost wages, $750,000 for pain and suffering, and $7 mil-
lion for loss of consortium.5  Judge Posner criticized the trial court judge for 
failing to indicate the reasoning process that connects the evidence to the 
damage award, and remanded the case to the district judge to revisit that 
award.6  Furthermore, Judge Posner proposed a legal formula for lower 
courts to use in determining the worth of a loved one’s companionship, 
which consisted of limiting such damages to a single-digit multiple of the 
compensatory damages.7  Judge Posner explained this approach: 
The first step in taking a ratio approach to calculating damages for 
loss of consortium would be to examine the average ratio in 
wrongful death cases in which the award of such damages was up-
held on appeal.  The next step would be to consider any special 
factors that might warrant a departure from the average in the case 
at hand.  Suppose the average ratio is 1:5—that in the average 
case, the damages awarded for loss of consortium are 20 percent of 
the damages awarded to compensate for the other losses resulting 
from the victim’s death.  The amount might then be adjusted up-
ward or downward on the basis of the number of the decedent’s 
children, whether they were minors or adults, and the closeness of 
 
1. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.61 (West 2004) (emphasis added). 
2. See infra notes 13–29 and accompanying text. 
3. Arpin v. United States, 521 F.3d 769, 775 (7th Cir. 2008). 
4. Id. at 771. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 775–77. 
7. Id. at 777. 
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the relationship between the decedent and his spouse and chil-
dren.8 
This case is illustrative of the variety of methods that have been pro-
posed for calculating loss of society, or loss of consortium,9 damages and 
the issues that arise when calculating such damages.  Loss of society dam-
ages are noneconomic damages that are awarded to compensate a wrongful 
death plaintiff for the loss of the decedent’s love, companionship, comfort, 
care, assistance, protection, affection, society, and moral support.10  The 
Arpin case also delves into the complex topic of awarding lump-sum dam-
ages rather than damages based off of evidence specific to the case.11  The 
issue regarding what evidence, if any, to use when calculating loss of soci-
ety or loss of consortium damages is a contentious one. 
Today, most courts limit the evidence the jury may consider when 
measuring loss of society damages to evidence of the relationship between 
the decedent and beneficiary before the death.12  As a result, this limitation 
requires the jury to speculate regarding the plaintiff’s loss because it is not 
able to consider evidence concerning how the death has actually affected 
the plaintiff.13  For example, if a plaintiff appeared to have a wonderful and 
loving relationship with the decedent before the death, but events after the 
death suggest that the plaintiff did not suffer a great loss because the plain-
tiff’s relationship with decedent was strained, the jury could not consider 
this evidence to mitigate damages.14  This article argues, however, that if 
the jury considered evidence of the decedent-beneficiary relationship as it 
was before and after the death, the jury could make a more accurate deter-
mination of damages.  This more nuanced approach would better harmonize 
with our tort system and the notion of compensatory damages because our 
tort system typically attempts to award full compensation for a tortious in-
jury.  This article further argues that in California and states with similar 
 
8. Id. 
9. Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Cal. 1977).  Loss of consortium is frequently 
called the “loss of society.” Id.  The California Supreme Court defines loss of society as the “loss 
of the deceased spouse’s love, companionship, comfort, affection, society, solace or moral sup-
port, loss of enjoyment of sexual relations, or any loss of physical assistance in the operation or 
maintenance of the home.” Id. 
10. Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1024-25 (Cal. 1977). 
11. See discussion infra Part IV.D (discussing this dichotomy in depth). 
12. See Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1024-25 (discussing evidence introduced by the plaintiff to show 
decedent was a warm and devoted mother); Cook v. Clay St. Hill R.R. Co., 60 Cal. 604, 609 
(1882) (allowing testimony regarding decedent’s relationship with heirs). 
13. Cherrigan v. City & County of S. F., 69 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48 (Ct. App. 1968) (“[E]vidence of 
conditions occurring after a wrongful death is inadmissible on the issue of damages because the 
latter are to be determined only by conditions which existed at the time the death occurred.”). 
14. See discussion infra pp. 3-4. 
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wrongful death statutes, courts should adopt a rule that admits most types of 
evidence showing the effects of the death on the beneficiary when the jury 
determines the value of the loss of decedent’s society.  This article does not 
argue that California should reform its wrongful death statute to allow for 
damages given specifically for the beneficiary’s grief and suffering.  
Rather, this article addresses the best ways to measure and value loss of so-
ciety damages and suggests which evidence is best suited to make that 
valuation. 
Part II of this article introduces two hypothetical stories, that of Caro-
lyn and Sophia, to better illustrate the inadequacies of the current approach 
that governs post-death evidence.  As this article progresses, it will consider 
Carolyn and Sophia’s stories in the context of the various solutions that 
have been proposed.  This article will then explore the changes to Carolyn 
and Sophia’s cases if the solution proposed by this article is adopted.  Part 
III briefly surveys the law of loss of society damages in wrongful death 
cases.  It will highlight many of the ways in which courts have traditionally 
measured and valued loss of society and will show the inherent difficulty of 
measuring noneconomic loss.  Part III will also explain how the courts have 
attempted to reconcile the problem of categorizing loss of society as a pe-
cuniary loss.  Part IV explores the general exclusionary rule, a rule which 
prohibits the admission of evidence occurring after a wrongful death and 
only allows for the admission of evidence occurring before the death.15  Part 
IV also explores the policies that justify this rule.  It then presents a new 
framework for understanding the goals of the general exclusionary rule and 
the limited situations to which this rule should apply. 
Part V explores the rule that prohibits recovery for grief and suffering 
damages in a wrongful death action and differentiates the law regarding 
measurement of loss of society and recovery for grief and suffering.  Part 
VI presents a final recommendation—that courts should adopt a rule pro-
viding that most types of evidence showing the effects of the death on the 
beneficiaries should be admitted to the jury in valuing the loss of decedent’s 
society.  This new approach will provide the most accurate measurement of 
loss of society damages.  Part VI then delves into the advantages and disad-
vantages of the final recommendation, concluding that a highly individu-
ated approach to the tort system, one that is context-specific and focuses on 
the individual, achieves optimal deterrence and full compensation in an al-
ready context-specific tort system using the most efficient means possible. 
 
15. Cherrigan, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 48 (“[E]vidence of conditions occurring after a wrongful 
death is inadmissible on the issue of damages because the latter are to be determined only by con-
ditions which existed at the time the death occurred.”). 
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II. TWO HYPOTHETICAL STORIES:  CAROLYN AND SOPHIA 
The following two cases illustrate the problem this article addresses.  
Carolyn is a thirty-one year old new mother.  She and her husband, Forest, 
gave birth to Alessandra three years ago.  Alessandra is their only child, and 
is the center of her parents’ attention.  One day, Carolyn left Alessandra 
with a babysitter.  Alessandra and her babysitter were on a drive when a 
drunk driver’s car collided with the babysitter’s car.  Alessandra was killed 
instantly.  Carolyn took her only daughter’s death very hard.  She became 
quite depressed and attempted suicide in the months after her daughter’s 
death.  She started seeing a therapist, who diagnosed her with severe de-
pression.  She and her husband, happily married for six years, divorced. 
Carolyn and Forest decided to bring a wrongful death action against the 
drunk driver.  Their attorney, however, told them that Alessandra’s life was 
worth very little in the eyes of the law.  The attorney explained that in Cali-
fornia, courts do not admit evidence of events that happened after Alessan-
dra’s death to determine the value of the loss of Alessandra’s society or 
consortium.16  Not only did Alessandra not contribute household services or 
provide income to the family, Alessandra’s society is seen as minimal in the 
eyes of the law because a three-year-old cannot provide as much love, com-
fort, and care as a loving adult can.  Thus, the fact that Carolyn was devas-
tated, attempted suicide, and was seeing a therapist is considered irrelevant 
when determining the value of the loss of Alessandra’s society. 
 
*** 
Sophia married Ethan at a young age.  She convinced herself that he 
was a good catch because he cared about her tremendously; however, she 
never felt that she was in love with him.  As the years went by, she became 
more annoyed with his constant showering of affection, gifts, and love.  
Even though he was a doctor and was able to take care of her and grant her 
wildest dreams, she started longing for something more.  She began dream-
ing of having an affair with someone else, although she never acted on her 
desires.  On the surface, however, their marriage seemed perfect.  One day, 
Ethan was involved in a serious car accident with a drunk driver and was 
pronounced dead shortly thereafter.  Sophia reacted strangely upon hearing 
the news of her husband’s death.  Doctors were shocked that she showed 
very little emotion when she arrived at the hospital.  One doctor noticed that 
she had a smile on her face after she identified the body.  Relatives noticed 
that she did not cry at the funeral.  Shortly after the funeral, Sophia received 
 
16. Id. 
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a very large check from her husband’s life insurance company.  She began 
spending furiously.  Three months later, she eloped on her yacht to the Car-
ibbean with a very handsome young man. 
Sophia consulted an attorney shortly after Ethan’s death to inquire 
about bringing a wrongful death action against the drunk driver.  The attor-
ney recognized immediately that Sophia’s case was a gold mine.  Ethan was 
a loving and caring husband, their marriage appeared blissful, no evidence 
suggested either’s infidelity, and Ethan had a very large income.  In particu-
lar, the value of Ethan’s society would be very high because he was such a 
kind, caring, and devoted husband.17  When the attorney learned of So-
phia’s apparent lack of grief after the death, her shopping sprees, and her 
new marriage, her attorney did not worry.  He understood that evidence of 
events that happened after Ethan’s death would be inadmissible at trial.18  
The jury would only receive evidence describing the seemingly perfect 
marriage that tragically ended with Ethan’s death.19 
The results of each of these stories seem counterintuitive and unjust.20  
Nevertheless, the current law mandates these outcomes.21  To understand 
 
17. See, e.g., Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1024-25 (awarding $300,000 for the wrongful death of a 
“warm and devoted mother”). Cf. Cook, 60 Cal. at 610 (stating that a verdict for $8,000 was just 
under the circumstances). 
18. Cherrigan, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 48. 
19. Andrew J. McClurg, Dead Sorrow: A Story About Loss and a New Theory of Wrongful 
Death Damages, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1, 29 (2005) (“Embittered persons who were scheduled to file 
for divorce the day after the accident can recover, while optimistic couples scheduled to get mar-
ried the same day cannot.”). 
20. See Wright v. Hoover, 329 F.2d 72, 73 (8th Cir. 1964).  Indeed, numerous actual cases 
also illustrate the rule’s injustice.  See, e.g., id.  In Wright, the plaintiff’s two year and three month 
old son died as a result of fatal injuries sustained in an automobile collision. Id.  The defendant 
admitted liability, and the trial court assessed no damages. Id. at 74.  The Eighth Circuit, applying 
substantive Nebraska law that limits recovery to the pecuniary value of decedent’s life, affirmed 
the trial court, and noted that: 
the ‘presumption of pecuniary loss’ only applies to the child’s expected contributions 
or services of monetary value, and it is still for the jury to determine the extent to 
which such presumed loss is offset by the amount which would have been expended 
for the deceased child’s maintenance and support.  Here, undoubtedly, the jury deter-
mined that the costs of raising the child would have outweighed the child’s monetary 
contributions to the father. 
Id. at 75.  The courts did not consider the effects of the death on the father.  In contrast, in In re 
Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, a wife brought a wrongful death action fol-
lowing her husband’s death during an airplane bombing.  887 F. Supp. 71, 72 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).  
The trial court awarded plaintiff $19,059,040, which included a $5 million award for loss of soci-
ety damages. Id.  The court noted the decedent’s character, his “affectionate relationship” with 
family and friends, and his “deep and abiding love and affection for his wife.” Id. at 73.  The court 
did not discuss the plaintiff’s feelings towards her husband or how his death affected her.  These 
facts may have been very damaging because he worked as an executive and was often away on 
business. Id. at 72-73. 
21. See infra notes 72-97. 
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the current law and the remedy proposed here, one must start at the begin-
ning. 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. WRONGFUL DEATH RECOVERY:  IN GENERAL 
The wrongful death system in the United States is most aptly summed 
up in the following statement: “Despite more than 150 years of legislative 
and common law development, . . . the American wrongful death system 
remains an illogical and discriminatory one that systematically undervalues 
human life and the far-reaching grief consequences to those left behind.”22  
Today in California, a beneficiary may recover both economic and none-
conomic damages in a wrongful death action.23  A beneficiary may recover 
economic damages, including financial support the decedent would have 
contributed to the family during either the life expectancy of the decedent 
or the life expectancy of the plaintiff, whichever is shorter; the loss of gifts 
or benefits the plaintiff would have expected to receive from the decedent; 
funeral and burial expenses; and the reasonable value of household services 
that the decedent would have provided.24  A beneficiary may also recover 
noneconomic damages, including loss of the decedent’s love, companion-
ship, comfort, care, assistance, protection, affection, society, moral support, 
loss of the enjoyment of sexual relations (only if the decedent is the spouse 
of the plaintiff),25 and loss of the decedent’s training and guidance.26 
The law governing wrongful death has had a tumultuous upbringing.  
In the past, common law held that killing a human being was not an action-
able wrong.27  Then the English Parliament passed Lord Campbell’s Act, 
which created a civil cause of action for wrongful death.28  Eventually, each 
 
22. McClurg, supra note 19, at 18. 
23. Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1025-26 (Cal. 1977); In re Air Crash Disaster Near 
Cerritos, Cal., on Aug. 31, 1986, 982 F.2d 1271, 1274 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992). 
24. Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 222, 227 n.2 (Ct. App. 2006) (summarizing 
the Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instruction on economic damages). 
25. A putative spouse also qualifies and may assert a wrongful death action against a tortfea-
sor.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West 2005).  A putative spouse is “the surviving spouse of 
a void or voidable marriage who is found by the court to have believed in good faith that the mar-
riage to the decedent was valid.” Id. 
26. See Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1025 (allowing recovery for loss of wife’s moral support and 
physical assistance in maintaining the home). 
27. Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1067 (1965) 
(“[I]t can be observed that Ellenborough’s blunt announcement that no civil action can be 
grounded upon the death of a human being not only lacked historical support at the time but was 
consistently ignored in America until 1848 . . . .”); McClurg, supra note 19, at 19. 
28. McClurg, supra note 19, at 20 (citing Lord Campbell’s Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 
(Eng.)). 
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state in the United States adopted a wrongful death statute similar to Lord 
Campbell’s Act, which limited recoverable damages to pecuniary, or eco-
nomic, losses.29  Under Lord Campbell’s Act, the beneficiary could only re-
cover the decedent’s financial contributions, in the form of services and in-
come.30  This approach resulted in numerous injustices.31  For example, the 
lives of children had a negative net worth because the cost of rearing a child 
exceeded the monetary value and service contributions that children made 
to their families.32  In addition, men’s lives were generally worth more than 
women’s lives under that wrongful death system because men earned more 
money than women.33  Disturbingly, this wrongful death system remains in 
some states.34 
Wrongful death law has slowly transitioned to allow recovery of loss of 
society in a majority of states, most likely as a result of judicial activism 
and courts’ attempts to create a more just wrongful death doctrine.35  To-
 
29. See STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY § 1:1 
(Clark, Boardman, Callaghan 3d ed. 1992) (stating Lord Ellenborough’s remarks became the basis 
for the rule that there was no wrongful death recovery in absence of statute);  see generally Stuart 
M. Speiser & Stuart S. Malawer, An American Tragedy: Damages for Mental Anguish of Be-
reaved Relatives in Wrongful Death Actions, 51 TUL. L. REV. 1, 5-8 (1976) (tracing the history 
and interpretation of Lord Campbell’s Act). 
30. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 127, at 949-50 (West Pub-
lishing Co. 5th ed. 1984) (1941) (discussing the common measure of damages in wrongful death 
actions). 
31. See McClurg, supra note 19, at 20-22. 
32. Selders v. Armentrout, 207 N.W.2d 686, 688-89 (Neb. 1973) (noting that “if the rule was 
literally followed, the average child would have negative worth”). 
33. McClurg, supra note 19, at 20-22.  Men continue to earn more money than women.  See 
Genaro C. Armas, In Most Jobs, It Pays to be a Man, MIAMI HERALD, June 4, 2004, at F1 (report-
ing findings from 2000 census data that, out of 505 job categories, women earned as much as, or 
more than, men in only five job categories; reporting that women on average earn seventy-four 
cents for every dollar men earn; and reporting the median annual income for women compared to 
men in the following job categories: lawyers ($66,000 for women compared to $95,000 for men), 
doctors ($88,000 for women compared to $140,000 for men); chief executives ($60,000 for wom-
en compared to $95,000 for men)). 
34. E.g. ALA. CODE § 6-5-410 (1975) (interpreted in Estes Health Care Ctrs., Inc. v. Ban-
nerman, 411 So. 2d 109, 112 (Ala. 1982) to allow only punitive damages in wrongful death cas-
es); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3 (McKinney 2002) (interpreted in Bell v. Cox, 388 
N.Y.S.2d 118, 118-19 (App. Div. 1976) as not allowing damages for “grief, loss of society or loss 
of companionship”).  Alabama and New York are the only two states that still model the Lord 
Campbell’s Act by denying loss of society damages and allowing recovery only for pecuniary 
losses. 
35. See, e.g., Wycko v. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Mich. 1960).  The Michigan Su-
preme Court reviewed a case in which a jury returned a verdict for  $15,000 on behalf of a father 
suing for the loss of his fourteen-year-old son, who was negligently killed in an auto accident. Id. 
at 119.  Struck by the injustice of the application of Michigan’s wrongful death statute to children, 
the Michigan Supreme Court expanded the meaning of pecuniary loss to include loss of society.  
Id. at 119-122.  See also, e.g., Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1026 (Cal. 1977).  The Califor-
nia Supreme Court, noting the injustice the Lord Campbell’s Act model compels, traced the his-
tory of California’s wrongful death law and its transition to allowing recovery for loss of society. 
Id. at 1024-25. 
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day, the general rule is that a plaintiff in a wrongful death action may re-
cover the following noneconomic damages in addition to the standard eco-
nomic damages: loss of the decedent’s love, companionship, comfort, care, 
assistance, protection, affection, society, and moral support.36  This is fre-
quently referred to simply as loss of society or loss of society and compan-
ionship.37  Various cases and statutes describe loss of society as including 
“society, companionship, love, affection, consortium, marital services, ma-
rital care, aid, tutelage, support, moral upbringing, experience, knowledge, 
cooperation, solicitude, comfort, pleasure, household services, guidance, 
advice, counsel, kindly offices, training, education, . . . assistance, attention, 
care, and protection.”38 
Although California courts allow recovery for loss of society, these 
courts uniformly hold that a plaintiff can only recover for pecuniary 
losses.39  Thus, California courts categorize loss of society as a pecuniary, 
or economic, loss.40  This creates a significant problem because a none-
conomic loss cannot be measured in the same way as a pecuniary loss.41  
 
36. Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1024-25.  A plaintiff in a wrongful death action may also recover the 
following economic damages: the value of the financial support that the decedent would have con-
tributed to the family, the loss of gifts or benefits that plaintiff could have expected to receive 
from decedent, funeral and burial expenses, and the amount paid to obtain household services that 
decedent would have provided.  Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 222, 227 n.2 (Ct. 
App. 2006). 
37. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 725 (Ct. App. 
2007) (referring to loss of society as “loss of society, affection and sexual companionship”). 
38. McClurg, supra note 19, at 26.  See, e.g., Mullen v. Posada Del Sol Health Care Ctr., 819 
P.2d 985, 986 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing damages for “loss of love, affection, companion-
ship, consortium, personal anguish and suffering”); Herbert v. District of Columbia, 808 A.2d 
776, 778 n.2 (D.C. 2002) (allowing damages for “lost services,” which include decedent’s “care, 
education, training, and personal advice”); Hepp v. Ader, 130 P.2d 859, 862 (Idaho 1942) (allow-
ing damages for “loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, guidance, advice, intellec-
tual training, etc.”).  Professors Posner and Sunstein argue that courts should consider loss of soci-
ety beyond that loss sustained by family: 
[m]ost people produce value that they do not fully consume or give to dependents; this 
value benefits strangers in the larger society.  Workers produce goods that consumers 
value more than the price that they pay; entrepreneurs start new businesses that em-
ploy people; people give to charity; inventors invent products whose value is greater 
than what the inventors can capture through patent law; the same is true of authors of 
books and the protections of copyright law; there are countless Good Samaritan acts; 
and many people devote their lives to public service.  When these people die, isn’t 
there a loss to society beyond the loss to the person who dies and his immediate family 
and friends? 
Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 578 (2005). 
39. Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1025; Bond v. United R.Rs., 113 P. 366, 372 (Cal. 1911); Griott v. 
Gamblin, 15 Cal. Rptr. 228, 230 (Ct. App. 1961). 
40. Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1025. 
41. Quiroz, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 227 n.2.  A beneficiary may recover economic damages, in-
cluding financial support the decedent would have contributed to the family during either the life 
expectancy of the decedent or the life expectancy of the plaintiff, whichever is shorter; the loss of 
gifts or benefits the plaintiff would have expected to receive from the decedent; funeral and burial 
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The irony has not been lost on the courts, however, and courts recognize the 
difficulty of measuring the pecuniary value of noneconomic damages.42  
Numerous courts reason that if damages were truly limited to pecuniary 
loss, many heirs’ would not be able to recover because they would be un-
able to prove noneconomic losses.43  The services of children, elderly par-
ents, or nonworking spouses often do not result in “measurable net income” 
to the beneficiaries, yet “unquestionably the death of such a person repre-
sents a substantial injury to the family for which just compensation should 
be paid.”44  Courts, however, still adhere to some form of the pecuniary loss 
rule, and states with wrongful death statutes similar to California hold that 
loss of society damages do not include damages for mental and emotional 
distress, including grief and sorrow.45  Few states have adopted a wrongful 
death system that allows damages for mental and emotional distress.46  A 
wrongful death system that recognizes emotional distress remains the far-
thest legal step away from the unjust pecuniary loss rule of Lord Camp-
bell’s Act. 
A minority of jurisdictions, including Florida,47 Louisiana,48 South 
Carolina,49 Virginia,50 and West Virginia,51 allow damages for mental an-
 
expenses; and the reasonable value of household services that the decedent would have provided. 
Id.  Financial support is determined by calculating the present value of the earnings the decedent 
would have contributed to the family during the period of that person’s life expectancy.  Riley v. 
Cal. Erectors, Inc., 111 Cal. Rptr. 459, 460 (Ct. App. 1973).  Mortality tables are admissible evi-
dence to show the  probable duration of the decedent’s life.  Powers v. Sutherland Auto Stage Co., 
213 P. 494, 495 (Cal. 1923).  Beneficiaries in a wrongful death action may submit a copy of the 
funeral bills to recover the reasonable value of funeral expenses.  In re Air Crash Disaster Near 
Cerritos, Cal., on Aug. 31, 1986, 982 F.2d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992).  In contrast, noneconomic 
damages are not as easily calculable.  A reviewing court has no fixed yardstick to measure the 
value of these elements of damage.  It is sufficient if the amount awarded appears to bear a rea-
sonable relation to the elements of loss entitled to be considered by the jury.  Fagerquist v. W. Sun 
Aviation, Inc., 236 Cal. Rptr. 633, 644-45 (Ct. App. 1987). 
42. Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1026. (“To direct the jury, on the one hand, to limit plaintiff’s recov-
ery to pecuniary losses alone while also compensating the plaintiff for loss of such nonpecuniary 
factors as the society, comfort, care and protection of a decedent is calculated to mislead and in-
vite confusion.”). 
43. Id. (“These cases suggest a realization that if damages truly were limited to ‘pecuniary’ 
loss, recovery frequently would be barred by the heirs’ inability to prove such a loss.”); Griott, 15 
Cal. Rptr. at 230; Wycko v. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118, 119-22 (Mich. 1960). 
44. Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1026. 
45. Id. at 1028 (“California cases have uniformly held that damages for mental and emo-
tional distress, including grief and sorrow, are not recoverable in a wrongful death action.”); Dick-
inson v. S. Pac. Co., 158 P. 183, 185 (Cal. 1916); Westfield Ins. Co. v. DeSimone, 247 Cal. Rptr. 
291, 295 (Ct. App. 1988). 
46. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text  (discussing Florida, Louisiana, South Car-
olina, Virginia, and West Virginia’s adoption of wrongful death systems that allow damages for 
mental and emotional distress). 
47. Callison v. Brake, 129 F. 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1904) (quoting a Florida statute that allows a 
parent to recover for mental suffering following the death of a child). 
48. Thompson v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 87 So. 716, 718 (La. 1921). 
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guish, suffering, bereavement, and solatium.52  In an action for the wrongful 
death of a six-year-old daughter, a court in Florida even allowed a father to 
recover for mental anguish that resulted in his subsequent incompetence.53  
The court noted: 
Those who have not brought a child into the world and loved it 
and planned for it, and then have it suddenly snatched away from 
them and killed can hardly have an adequate idea of the mental 
pain and anguish that one undergoes from such a tragedy.  No oth-
er affliction so tortures and wears down the physical and nervous 
system.  Psychosomatic illness of a serious nature may follow.  
The emotions may be unstrung, the nerves put on edge and the end 
effect may be a period in a rest home, a mental hospital, serious 
physical derangement and sometimes death.54 
Although the law appears fairly straightforward in this area, it becomes 
much more complicated in its practical application.  Furthermore, it is not 
clear how to measure loss of society damages and what evidence the jury is 
able to consider in determining the value of these damages. 
B. MEASUREMENT OF LOSS OF SOCIETY:  LOOKING ONLY  
TO THE PAST 
Accordingly, the means by which courts measure loss of society be-
come not only quite complicated but also subject to a great deal of debate.  
In addition to the matters usually considered when calculating loss of soci-
 
49. Brown v. S. Ry., 43 S.E. 794, 796 (S.C. 1903). 
50. Va. Iron, Coal, & Coke Co. v. Odle’s Adm’r, 105 S.E. 107, 116 (Va. 1920). 
51. Kelley v. Ohio River R. Co., 52 S.E. 520, 523 (W. Va. 1905). 
52. See McClurg, supra note 19, at 6 (explaining recent proposals that would extend wrong-
ful death recovery to include hedonic damages).  Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic 
Damages: The Rapidly Bubbling Cauldron, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (2004).  Hedonic 
damages are damages for loss of enjoyment of life. Id.  Hedonic damages are perhaps described 
most aptly in the Schwartz & Silverman article: 
[i]n 1977, MasterCard launched a successful advertising campaign that pointed out the 
‘priceless’ moments in life.  MasterCard’s ‘Priceless’ ads proclaimed, ‘There are some 
things money can’t buy.  For everything else, there’s MasterCard.’  The ads empha-
sized the personal relationship and sentimental, special moments that make life good.  
It is priceless, for example, for a preschooler to spill most of the milk from her cereal 
bowl down her shirt, for a mother to take her adult daughter to the place where she 
first met her husband, or for a child to come home after a night of camping in the 
neighbor’s backyard.  The notion of hedonic damages, however, takes the opposite 
approach.  It implies that every positive life experience can and should be converted 
into a cash equivalent, and asks the jury to do so. 
Id. at 1043. 
53. Coast Cities Coaches v. Donat, 106 So. 2d 593, 594 (Fla. 1958). 
54. Id. at 597 (quoting Winner v. Sharp, 43 So.2d 634, 636-37 (Fla. 1949)). 
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ety,55 courts also consider the nature of the decedent-beneficiary relation-
ship.56  When inquiring into the nature of the decedent-beneficiary relation-
ship, courts have admitted evidence of the closeness of the family unit, the 
warmth of feeling between family members, and the character of the dece-
dent as “kind and attentive” or “kind and loving.”57  Courts place an em-
phasis on the nature of the decedent-beneficiary relationship.  Thus, it is 
important to inquire precisely how the courts consider this relationship. 
In valuing loss of society, courts are generally backward-looking as 
opposed to forward-looking.58  Courts evaluate the strength of the relation-
ship between the decedent and beneficiary and rarely consider post-death 
evidence when determining damages.59  Indeed, most judicial opinions con-
sidering loss of society begin with a detailed description of the relationship 
between the beneficiary and decedent, using that as a basis to determine the 
value of the loss of society.60  For example, in a husband and his five chil-
dren’s wrongful death action for the death of their wife and mother, the 
court described at great length the relationship between the husband, wife 
and children.61  The court only considered a description of the relationship 
when determining the plaintiff’s loss of society damages.62  The court noted 
that the evidence showed that the wife was a “warm and devoted mother.”63  
The court also discussed the wife’s age at death, her good health, and her 
decision to retire as a legal secretary to care for her husband who had a 
condition that required constant attention.64  In addition, the court described 
the wife as having “primary responsibility for maintaining the family home 
and garden and for attending to a minor son who resided at home.”65  The 
court placed special emphasis on the minor son’s heavy dependence upon 
 
55. Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Cal. 1977) (including loss of the deceased 
spouse’s “love, companionship, comfort, affection, society, solace or moral support, loss of en-
joyment of sexual relations, or any loss of her physical assistance in the operation or maintenance 
of the home”). 
56. Benwell v. Dean, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394, 398 (Ct. App. 1967) (“It is well established in this 
state, moreover, that evidence of the nature of the personal relationship that existed between the 
decedent and the beneficiaries of a wrongful death action has a bearing on the compensation for 
loss of society, comfort and protection, and is therefore ordinarily admissible in such an action.”).  
See, e.g., Cook v. Clay St. Hill R.R. Co., 60 Cal. 604, 609 (1882); Griott v. Gamblin, 15 Cal. Rptr. 
228, 229 (Ct. App. 1961). 
57. See Cook, 60 Cal. at 609; Benwell, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 398; Griott, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 229. 
58. See Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1025. 
59. See, e.g., Cook, 60 Cal. at 609; Benwell, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 398; Griott, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 229. 
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his mother.66  Finally, the court noted that a “high degree of family socializ-
ing” existed, including with the grandchildren.67 
Similarly, in a widow’s wrongful death action for the death of her hus-
band, the court described the husband’s relationship with his wife and chil-
dren and noted that the husband was normally home after business hours, 
that he and his wife were happily married, that the wife was an invalid and 
unable to leave the house, that the husband was very kind and attentive to 
her, and that the wife was dependent upon the husband.68  The court also 
considered the daughter’s testimony that he was a kind father, that the fam-
ily was happy, and that the husband was kind and loving to his wife.69 
Thus, courts generally only consider the relationship between the bene-
ficiary and the decedent before the death.  The question then becomes 
whether the courts may look forward to determine loss of society damages 
and whether courts may consider evidence of circumstances occurring after 
the death, as well as evidence of the death’s effect on the beneficiaries.  
This question is surprisingly difficult to answer.  Very few courts have ad-
dressed this issue head-on, and the courts that have considered the issue 
come to differing conclusions and provide little support for those conclu-
sions.70  The wrongful death system is based on justice and fairness,71 and 
thus courts must utilize a uniform and accurate system for measuring loss of 
society damages.  Thus, courts should address what a jury may consider 
when determining wrongful death loss of society damages. 
Two doctrines tend to result in courts excluding evidence of post-death 
circumstances and conditions: the general exclusionary rule and the grief 
and suffering rule.  As this article argues, however, neither doctrine should 
apply to the use of post-death evidence to measure loss of society damages, 
outside of a few limited types of post-death evidence.  Each of these doc-
trines are considered in turn below. 
IV. THE GENERAL EXCLUSIONARY RULE:  THE FUTURE IS 
IRRELEVANT 
The general exclusionary rule is perhaps best described as a rule that 
prohibits the admission of evidence occurring after the wrongful death in 




68. Cook v. Clay St. Hill R.R. Co., 60 Cal. 604, 609-10 (1882). 
69. Id. 
70. See discussion infra Part VI.A. 
71. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.61 (West 2004) (“In an action under this article, damages 
may be awarded that, under all the circumstances of the case, may be just . . . .”). 
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are unclear to some California courts.  Although the general exclusionary 
rule initially appears to apply to all post-death evidence used for loss of so-
ciety damages, this Part will show that the rule is much more complicated, 
has numerous exceptions, and has not been applied uniformly by courts.  
Indeed, a great deal of confusion surrounds this rule.  Additionally, courts 
do not agree on how to apply this rule and few courts have undertaken a 
discussion of this rule that would assist in its interpretation and application. 
A. A BRIEF EXPOSÉ 
In California, one court of appeals stated that there is a general exclu-
sionary rule, which provides that “evidence of conditions occurring after a 
wrongful death is inadmissible on the issue of damages because the latter 
are to be determined only by conditions which existed at the time the death 
occurred.”72  Another court stated that damages in a wrongful death action 
are measured by the situation existing at the time of the act causing death 
and not by events occurring after the act.73 
For example, in Cherrigan v. City and County of San Francisco,74 the 
trial court held that evidence of the plaintiff widow’s remarriage was not 
admissible to mitigate the plaintiff’s damages.75  The court of appeals af-
firmed and stated that this ruling was consistent with California’s legislative 
policy and the California Supreme Court’s analysis in prior cases.76  First, 
the court of appeals set forth three policy rationales for the rule: evidence of 
remarriage as proof of mitigation of damages is speculative, evidence of 
remarriage or of death benefits unduly profits the defendant, and damages 
should be determinable at the time of death.77  Then, the court of appeals 
cited to the California Supreme Court’s decision in McLaughlin v. United 
Railroads of San Francisco,78 which stated that the exclusionary rule is 
“more in consonance with justice” than the English rule admitting all post-
death evidence because the tortfeasor benefits from the remarriage that re-
sulted from the death the tortfeasor caused.79  The California Supreme 
Court explained that the law measures the consequences of the tortfeasor’s 
 
72. Cherrigan v. City & County of S.F., 69 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48 (Ct. App. 1968). 
73. McLaughlin v. United R.Rs. of S.F., 147 P. 149, 151 (Cal. 1915). 
74. 69 Cal. Rptr. 42 (Ct. App. 1968). 
75. Cherrigan, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 47-48. 
76. Id. at 48. 
77. Id. at 47-48.  See also Benwell v. Dean, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394, 402 (Ct. App. 1967); Steven 
T. Densley, Admissibility of Evidence That a Spouse has Remarried in a Wrongful Death Action in 
Utah, 3 J.L. FAM. STUD. 145, 145 n.2 (2001) ;see discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing the policy 
rationales for the exclusionary rule). 
78. 147 P. 149, 151 (Cal. 1915). 
79. Cherrigan, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 48 (citing McLaughlin, 147 P. at 151). 
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act by the situation existing at the time of the act and not by any situation 
existing after the act.80  Finally, the California Supreme Court in McLaugh-
lin quoted and explained language from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
as follows: 
The true question is, what had these plaintiffs the right to expect to 
receive from the parent during his life . . . and for the loss of this 
are to be compensated.  What they got after his death does not en-
ter into the case.  The loss spoken of is the taking away of that 
which they were receiving, and would have received had he lived.  
It is the destruction of their expectations in this regard that the law 
deals with, and for which it furnishes compensation.  To say, 
“True it is we have taken from you his benefactions, but you get 
by law, not from us, but from his estate which we thus make avail-
able for you, something better,” is to substitute the heirs’ legal 
right under the law for the company’s liability.  This rule of evi-
dence has its foundation in the refusal of the court to allow the de-
fendant to benefit by his own wrong, to lessen his responsibility in 
damages for the injury which he has inflicted, by showing that, 
quite fortuitously, through no contribution of defendant’s own, the 
plaintiffs have received a certain pecuniary benefit.81 
It is very easy to apply this rule to Carolyn and Sophia’s stories.  Quite 
simply, evidence of anything that happened after Alessandra’s death and 
Ethan’s death is inadmissible to determine the loss of society damages that 
Carolyn and Sophia will respectively receive.  But, as a result of this rule, 
Carolyn will receive less in noneconomic damages because the jury will not 
be allowed to consider Carolyn’s devastation resulting from the loss of her 
daughter; Sophia, however, will receive more because the jury will only be 
allowed to consider the quality of the marriage and characteristics of So-
phia’s husband rather than Sophia’s lack of grief after his death.  Common 
sense and notions of justice, however, dictate that precisely the opposite 
should occur, and that Carolyn should receive more damages for loss of so-
ciety than Sophia. 
Although this rule seems bright-line, broad, and applicable to the issue 
of post-death evidence, upon further examination, it is much more complex 
than it appears.  Indeed, the rule is applied only to limited types of evidence 
and has many exceptions, which are discussed in more depth below. 
 
80. McLaughlin, 147 P. at 151. 
81. Id. at 151 (citing Stahler v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 49 A. 273 (Pa. 1901)). 
       
138 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:123 
B. THE EVOLUTION:  WHERE DID IT COME FROM? 
The court’s use of broad language in Cherrigan v. City and County of 
San Francisco to define the exclusionary rule is not supported by the ori-
gins of the rule because the rule was initially used only to exclude evidence 
of a plaintiff’s remarriage or engagement to remarry, a plaintiff’s post-death 
affair, or a plaintiff’s receipt of death benefits.82  Thus, the Cherrigan court 
interpreted the exclusionary rule much more broadly than originally in-
tended. 
Although the Cherrigan court defined the exclusionary rule broadly, a 
California appellate court stated in Benwell v. Dean83 that the rule only ap-
plies to evidence of remarriage: “the majority rule is that the surviving 
spouse’s remarriage, or the possibility84 thereof, does not affect the dam-
ages recoverable in an action for the wrongful death of the deceased 
spouse.”85  Courts have widely recognized that a surviving spouse’s remar-
riage is immaterial on the issue of damages for wrongful death when of-
fered only to mitigate damages.86  Thus, in a wrongful death action, courts 
have held that a plaintiff’s remarriage and all evidence arising from it are 
inadmissible unless the moving party demonstrates the evidence’s rele-
vancy and materiality to an issue in the case.87 
Still other courts have applied the rule only to evidence of death bene-
fits and inheritance.88  The fact-finder may not consider whether the benefi-
ciary has received any benefits—such as inheritance or insurance—when 
assessing damages in a wrongful death action, either as an item of deduc-
tion or as a ground for awarding only nominal damages.89  This rule is pre-
mised on the courts’ refusal to allow a defendant to benefit from his or her 
own wrong.90  It is designed to prevent a defendant from reducing his or her 
 
82. See McLaughlin, 147 P. at 149 (excluding evidence of property received by beneficiaries 
upon death); Cherrigan, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 48 (excluding evidence of remarriage). 
83. 57 Cal. Rptr. 394 (Ct. App. 1967). 
84. Cherrigan, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 47-48.  The admissibility of the possibility of remarriage ver-
sus actual remarriage is a hotly contested issue. Id. Litigants argue that while the possibility of 
remarriage is not admissible because it is speculative, certainty that a surviving spouse has remar-
ried is admissible because it is much less speculative as to the mitigating affects of the new mar-
riage. Id. 
85. Benwell, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 402. 
86. Cherrigan, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 47; Kimery v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 562 P.2d 858, 860 
(Okla. 1977); Shields v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 105 P.2d 347, 352 (Utah 1940). 
87. Cherrigan, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 47; Bradfield v. Burgess’ Estate, 233 N.W.2d 541, 543 
(Mich. 1975); Shields, 105 P.2d at 352. 
88. McLaughlin v. United R.Rs. of S.F., 147 P. 149, 149 (Cal. 1915); Wilson v. City & 
County of S.F., 235 P.2d 81, 84 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951). 
89. McLaughlin, 147 P. at 151; Wilson, 235 P.2d at 84. 
90. McLaughlin, 147 P. at 151. 
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responsibility in damages for an injury that he or she has inflicted, “by 
showing that, quite fortuitously, through no contribution [of his or her 
own], the [decedent’s beneficiaries] have received certain pecuniary bene-
fit.”91  Indeed, this rule is premised on the same rationale underlying the 
collateral source rule.92  Thus, a beneficiary’s inheritance of assets will not 
diminish the beneficiary’s ability to recover damages in a wrongful death 
action.93 
The exclusionary rule developed out of the doctrines regarding the ad-
missibility of evidence of remarriage and death benefits.94  The Cherrigan 
court cited to numerous cases including McLaughlin v. United Railroads of 
San Francisco, Benwell v. Dean, and Wood v. Alves95 to support its argu-
ment that the broad exclusionary rule exists,96 despite the fact that the hold-
ings in those cases were limited to situations in which the defendant sought 
to introduce evidence of remarriage or death benefits to mitigate damages.97  
Because the exclusionary rule developed out of these doctrines, a wholesale 
application of the rule to all post-death evidence should be scrutinized very 
carefully. 
C. THE POLICIES OF THE GENERAL EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
California courts set forth three rationales for the application of a broad 
exclusionary rule: (1) evidence of remarriage as proof of mitigation of dam-
ages is speculative, (2) evidence of remarriage or of death benefits unduly 
profits the defendant, and (3) damages should be determinable at the time of 
death.98 
 
91. Stathos v. Lemich, 28 Cal. Rptr. 462, 465 (Ct. App. 1963). 
92. See infra text accompanying notes 102-115;  see generally Helen Gunnarsson, Collateral 
Source Rule and Med Bills: Plaintiff’s, Defense Bar Each Win One, 95 ILL. B.J. 345, 345 (2007) 
(describing the collateral source rule generally, applying the collateral source rule to medical bills, 
and critiquing a case that held that a plaintiff can recover the amount a medical provider charges 
the plaintiff for treatment and is not limited to the lesser amount the plaintiff’s insurer negotiated 
with the provider); Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths, 50 
J.L. & ECON. 221, 226, 230 (2007) (describing the collateral source rule generally and arguing 
that the collateral source rule is associated with higher death rates). 
93. Stathos, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 464. 
94. See McLaughlin, 147 P. at 151; Cherrigan v. City & County of S.F., 69 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48 
(Ct. App. 1968). 
95. 13 Cal. Rptr. 114, 117 (Ct. App. 1961). 
95. 13 Cal. Rptr. 114, 117 (Ct. App. 1961). 
96. Cherrigan, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 48. 
97. See McLaughlin, 147 P. at 151; Benwell v. Dean, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394, 402 (Ct. App. 1967); 
Wood, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 117. 
98. See Cherrigan, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 48; Benwell, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 402; Densley, supra note 77, 
at 145 n.2.  While other policies, such as privacy, distortion, and the social incentives of remar-
riage also likely play a role in justifying the exclusionary rule, the California courts expressly rely 
on the three rationales stated above to justify the rule. 
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The principle rationale for a broad application of the exclusionary rule 
is that evidence of remarriage as proof in mitigation of damages is specula-
tive.99  As the Benwell court noted, “the surviving spouse’s remarriage is 
highly speculative, because it involves a comparison of the prospective 
earnings, services, and contributions of the deceased spouse with those of 
the new spouse.”100  Courts are seemingly reluctant to compare the de-
ceased with the new spouse to determine if the new spouse can replace the 
old spouse’s contributions, financial or otherwise.101  This rationale, of 
course, is not applicable to evidence of death benefits, from a life insurance 
policy for instance, because a monetary amount is easily deductible from an 
award and is thus not speculative. 
Second, courts justify the exclusionary rule because evidence that a 
plaintiff remarried or received death benefits would provide “undue profit 
to the defendant.”102  Essentially, courts apply the collateral source rule to 
exclude evidence of remarriage or of death benefits from the jury.103  The 
collateral source rule provides that “if an injured plaintiff [receives] com-
pensation for the injury from a collateral source such as insurance, that 
payment [is not] deducted from the damages that the plaintiff can collect 
from the tortfeasor.”104  Courts reason that tortfeasors should not recover a 
windfall from a plaintiff’s thrift and foresight to provide for themselves or 
their families through having actually or constructively secured insurance, 
pension or disability benefits in the event of death or injury.105  A contrary 
rule, it is feared, would misallocate liability for tort-caused losses and dis-
courage people from obtaining benefits from independent collateral 
sources.106 
Several cases illustrate the use of the collateral source rule as a ration-
ale for excluding evidence of remarriage or death benefits.107  In Bunda v. 
 
99. See Cherrigan, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 48; see also Benwell, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 402. 
100. Benwell, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 402. 
101. See Cherrigan, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 48; Benwell, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 402. 
102. Cherrigan, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 48; see also Benwell, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 402. 
103. Kimery v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 562 P.2d 858, 859 (Okla. 1977).  See generally 
Gunnarsson, supra note 92, at 345 (describing the collateral source rule generally, applying the 
collateral source rule to medical bills, and critiquing a case that stands for the proposition that a 
plaintiff can recover the amount a medical provider charges the plaintiff for treatment and is not 
limited to the lesser amount the plaintiff’s insurer negotiated with the provider); Rubin & Shep-
herd, supra note 92, at 230 (describing the collateral source rule generally and arguing mathemati-
cally that the collateral source rule is associated with higher death rates). 
104. Lund v. San Joaquin Valley R.R., 71 P.3d 770, 774 (Cal. 2003). 
105. Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 69-70 (Cal. 1970). 
106. Id. 
107. See, e.g., Benwell v. Dean, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394, 402-03 (Ct. App. 1967) (explaining the 
majority rule that damages are not affected by remarriage); Bunda v. Hardwick, 138 N.W.2d 305, 
308 (Mich. 1966). 
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Hardwick,108 the court overruled five prior cases that had allowed evidence 
of remarriage to mitigate damages and held that such evidence was irrele-
vant and should be excluded.109  The court noted that although the jury 
would benefit from receiving evidence of remarriage, the possible resultant 
harm outweighed that benefit.110  The court also stated that the evidence in-
volved a collateral source which was not a proper jury concern.111  In Ben-
well v. Dean, the court explained the collateral source rule’s application to 
evidence of remarriage when it stated, “it was more reasonable to say that a 
defendant should not be allowed to profit by an actual or possible remar-
riage of the widow, just as he may not profit through monies coming to her 
from insurance policies purchased by her husband upon his own life, or 
from some other collateral source.”112 
Thus, courts reason that the tortfeasor should not benefit from his or 
her own tortious action.113  The plaintiff only remarries because the dece-
dent died.  The plaintiff only receives benefits from the death because the 
decedent died.  Therefore, the plaintiff only remarries or receives death 
benefits because the defendant caused the death.  Courts do not want the de-
fendant to benefit from causing that death by mitigating damages when the 
plaintiff remarries, receives death benefits, or gives birth to another child.114  
Evidence of remarriage and any type of death benefits, then, is not admissi-
ble to mitigate a plaintiff’s damages.115 
The final rationale for the exclusionary rule, according to Benwell v. 
Dean, is that “the cause of action arises at the time of the decedent’s death 
and the damages are determinable as of the same time . . . .”116  This ration-
ale is embodied in the statement: “[e]vidence of conditions occurring after a 
wrongful death is inadmissible on the issue of damages because the latter 
are to be determined only by conditions which existed at the time the death 
occurred.”117  The court offers little explanation of this policy and most cas-
es focus on preventing the tortfeasor from benefiting from the wrong.118  
 
108. 138 N.W.2d 305 (Mich. 1966). 
109. Bunda, 138 N.W.2d at 313. 
110. Id. at 309. 
111. Id. 
112. Benwell, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 402-03 (citing Reynolds v. Willis, 209 A.2d 760, 763 (Del. 
1965)). 
113. See Cherrigan v. City & County of S.F., 69 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48 (Ct. App. 1968); Benwell, 
57 Cal. Rptr. at 403. 
114. See Cherrigan, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 48; Benwell, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 402. 
115. See McLaughlin v. United R.Rs. of S.F., 147 P. 149, 151 (Cal. 1915); Cherrigan, 69 
Cal. Rptr. at 48; Benwell, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 403. 
116. Benwell, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 402. 
117. Cherrigan, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 48. 
118. See, e.g., McLaughlin, 147 P. at 151; Benwell, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 403. 
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Nevertheless, it appears likely that the courts seek to limit the scope of in-
quiry for the sake of simplicity, finality, and certainty in damages at the 
time of death.119  These three main rationales to exclude at least some post-
death evidence are certainly valid and deserve close attention in determin-
ing the most fair and just doctrine that should apply to post-death evidence. 
D. THE CONFUSION AND INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
As noted above, the exclusionary rule is not applied uniformly, it has 
many exceptions, and it is confusing.120  For example, a court may admit 
evidence of remarriage for purposes other than calculating damages, includ-
ing the impeachment of witnesses.121  In Rayner v. Ramirez,122 the court al-
lowed evidence pertaining to the plaintiff’s remarriage in order to impeach 
the plaintiff.123  In Rayner, when the plaintiff was asked on cross-
examination whether she had remarried since the death of her husband, she 
denied it.124  She denied that she married Mr. Carroll Bennet after her hus-
band’s death, and that her sister, Carol Thomas, observed the ceremony as a 
witness.125 She also denied having knowledge that both Carroll Bennet and 
Carol Thomas had lived with her parents since her husband’s death.126  Af-
ter the marriage certificate was admitted into evidence, she conceded that 
Ms. Thomas was in fact her sister, but still denied her second marriage.127  
After the minister who married her testified, she finally admitted that she 
had in fact married a second time and that her sister had been present.128  
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the court erred in refusing to strike evi-
dence pertaining to the plaintiff’s second marriage and for refusing to in-
struct the jury that all evidence related to the marriage was limited to im-
peaching her testimony and could not be considered to diminish or divert 
 
119. See In re Marriage of Kieturakis, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 119, 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Tracy 
A. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 684, 693 n.17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
120. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 767 F.2d 
1151, 1153-54 (5th Cir. 1985); Conway v. Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 525 F.2d 927, 929-30 
(5th Cir. 1976); Rayner v. Ramirez, 324 P.2d 83, 86-87 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Dubil v. La-
bate, 245 A.2d 177, 179 (N.J. 1968);  see Densley, supra note 77, at 145 (displaying an excellent 
discussion of the many different applications and interpretations of the exclusionary rule as ap-
plied to remarriage). 
121. See Rayner, 324 P.2d at 83; see also Densley, supra note 77, at 153-54 (discussing the 
use of evidence of remarriage for impeachment purposes). 
122. 324 P.2d 83 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). 





128. Id. at 91. 
       
2009] THE WORTH OF A HUMAN LIFE 143 
her claim.129  The court noted that the plaintiff did not object to the cross-
examination until the marriage certificate had been presented.130  The appel-
late court found that the marriage certificate was properly admitted, at least 
for the purpose of impeachment, and did have some bearing on the question 
of loss of comfort, society, and support.131 
In addition, a court may admit evidence of remarriage for other limited 
purposes.132  In Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc.,133 the court 
recognized that it was obligated to apply the rules of evidence to the ques-
tion of admissibility of remarriage.134  The Federal Rules of Evidence have 
a policy of broadly admitting evidence, and therefore, “[the Federal Rules’] 
treatment of comparable issues suggests that the evidence [of remarriage] is 
admissible for background and perhaps various other limited purposes.”135 
Furthermore, evidence of remarriage may also be admissible if the 
plaintiff opens the door to his or her emotional state.136  For example, the 
appellate court in In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana. 
on July 9, 1982137 upheld the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of re-
marriage later in the trial after the plaintiff offered evidence that he was un-
able to function emotionally and could not form and maintain relationships 
with others.138 
Finally, a court may admit evidence of remarriage if suppression of that 
evidence would offend the integrity of the judicial process.139  This may oc-
cur if the plaintiff is permitted to misrepresent his or her marital status to 
the jury.140  In a case where the trial court ruled that the plaintiff was to be 
referred to at trial by her former name, the appellate court reversed, stating: 
Though evidence of the plaintiff’s remarriage is not relevant to the 
question of damages, we disagree with the trial court’s attempt to 
suppress any mention of the remarriage.  It would be offensive to 
the integrity of the judicial process if the plaintiff, after taking an 
 
129. Id. at 90. 
130. Id. at 91. 
131. Id. 
132. Conway v. Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 525 F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 1976). 
133. 525 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1976). 
134. Id. at 930. 
135. Id.; see, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407 (discussing admissibility of subsequent remedial meas-
ures); FED. R. EVID. 411 (discussing admissibility of liability insurance coverage). 
136. In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 767 F.2d 1151, 1154 
(5th Cir. 1985). 
137. 767 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985). 
138. Id. at 1154. 
139. See Dubil v. Labate, 245 A.2d 177, 181 (N.J. 1968). 
140. Id. 
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oath to be truthful, were permitted to misrepresent her marital sta-
tus to the jury.  Of course, the defendants may not inquire into the 
details of the remarriage nor may they offer evidence concerning 
it.  However, the desirable exclusion of evidence relating to the 
remarriage may not be carried to the point of affirmatively misrep-
resenting the truth to the jury.  It seems to us that in the course of 
the trial of a wrongful death case, it would be virtually impossible 
to avoid mention of a remarriage without resorting to untruths.141 
Because the exclusionary rule is couched in such confusion, there is an 
even greater need to adopt a framework that clearly defines its boundaries, 
application, and interpretation. 
E. A NEW FRAMEWORK:  THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE SHOULD BE 
LIMITED TO THE  POLICIES UNDERLYING THE RULE 
 The exclusionary rule should only apply to those situations 
where the defendant attempts to introduce evidence of conditions 
that occur after the wrongful death in order to mitigate damages 
and only when that evidence is either too speculative to mitigate 
damages or unduly profits the defendant.  In all other situations, 
the rule should admit all post-death evidence, subject to the grief 
and suffering rule. 
Courts should adopt a new framework for applying the exclusionary 
rule and should limit the application of the exclusionary rule to only those 
situations when the defendant attempts to introduce evidence of conditions 
that occur after the wrongful death in order to mitigate damages and only in 
those situations when that evidence is either too speculative to mitigate 
damages or unduly profits the defendant.  In all other situations, the new 
framework would admit all post-death evidence, subject to the grief and 
suffering rule, as discussed below.142  Currently, the scope of  the exclu-
sionary rule and what it actually excludes is unclear.143  California courts 
generally apply this rule when a defendant seeks to offer evidence that a 
widowed plaintiff has remarried, a widowed plaintiff has had an affair since 
the death, or a plaintiff has received death benefits or inheritance from the 
 
141. Id. at 180. 
142. See discussion infra Parts V and VI. The reader may object at this point, arguing that 
this proposal seeks to prevent a defendant from mitigating damages while allowing a plaintiff to 
aggravate damages freely.  In Parts V and VI, however, this Article proposes that a plaintiff’s 
damages are also limited by the grief and suffering rule. 
143. See supra notes 120-141 and accompanying text. 
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decedent’s death in order to mitigate damages.144  However, the  California 
Supreme Court has left open the question of whether the exclusionary rule 
applies to all post-death evidence.145  Many courts appear to take it as an 
unspoken rule that post-death evidence is not to be used to determine 
wrongful death loss of society damages.146  The law should clearly lay out 
precisely when the exclusionary rule should apply.  The new framework of-
fered by this article clearly specifies that the exclusionary rule should only 
apply to those situations when the defendant attempts to introduce evidence 
of conditions that occur after the wrongful death in order to mitigate dam-
ages and only when that evidence is either too speculative to mitigate dam-
ages or unduly profits the defendant.  In all other situations, the new 
framework should admit all post-death evidence, subject to the grief and 
suffering rule because the law still disfavors awarding damages for grief 
and suffering. 
Tellingly, the policies and rationales that underlie the exclusionary rule 
are irrelevant to some evidence of the death’s effects on the beneficiary 
when calculating damages for loss of society.  Thus, because the rationales 
do not apply to all post-death evidence, courts should not use the exclusion-
ary rule to exclude that evidence.  Courts should only use the exclusionary 
rule to exclude evidence to which its rationales actually apply.  The ration-
ale that evidence of remarriage is speculative is not applicable to the issue 
of whether the effects of the death should be admissible to determine loss of 
society.  Admitting evidence of the death’s effects on the beneficiaries 
would make the determination of loss of society less speculative and more 
accurate.  A court can more precisely measure a plaintiff’s loss by consider-
ing the plaintiff’s situation before the loss as well as after the loss.  Indeed, 
limiting consideration of the decedent-beneficiary relationship before the 
death makes the loss of society determination more speculative.  Thus, the 
policy to exclude speculative evidence like remarriage actually requires the 
admission of post-death evidence of the death’s effects to determine loss of 
society damages. 
Similarly, the rationale that the courts should not admit evidence of 
remarriage and death benefits because it would provide undue profit to the 
defendant is also not applicable to the issue of whether evidence of the 
death’s effects on the beneficiaries is admissible to determine loss of soci-
 
144. See Cherrigan v. City & County of S.F., 69 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48 (Ct. App. 1968); see also 
McLaughlin v. United R.Rs. of S.F., 147 P. 149, 151 (Cal. 1915); Benwell v. Dean, 57 Cal. Rptr. 
394, 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). 
145. See supra notes 82-118 and accompanying text. 
146. See discussion supra Part III.B. (explaining that courts are rarely, if ever, forward-
looking when determining wrongful death loss of society damages). 
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ety.  First, evidence of the death’s effects would not always provide a profit 
to the defendant.  In Carolyn’s story, the effects of her daughter’s death 
would aggravate the damages rather than lessen them because the evidence 
would show the great extent of Carolyn’s loss.  The defendant would obvi-
ously not profit from the admission of this evidence.  Evidence of the 
death’s effects would only mitigate damages if the heirs appeared not to 
suffer great loss, such as in Sophia’s story.  Second, if evidence of the 
death’s effects would profit the defendant by mitigating damages, as in So-
phia’s story, such profit is not undue.  The evidence of the death’s effects 
does not subtract an amount of money from a pre-determined value for eco-
nomic losses and loss of society damages; rather, the evidence of the 
death’s effects is used simply to measure the pecuniary value of loss of so-
ciety.  For example, when receipt of death benefits is used to lessen dam-
ages, the fact-finder first measures economic losses by considering the de-
cedent’s future potential income and life expectancy.147  Then the fact-
finder considers the nature of the decedent-beneficiary relationship to de-
termine the value of the loss of society.  Finally, the fact-finder subtracts the 
value of the death benefits from the sum of economic losses and loss of so-
ciety.  In contrast, when evidence of the death’s effects mitigates damages, 
this evidence is used when the fact-finder values the loss of society itself, 
and not as a deduction after the loss of society is valued.  Thus, the evi-
dence of the death’s effects does not bestow an undue profit upon either 
party because it does not deduct from the beneficiary’s pre-determined pe-
cuniary losses.  It is used as a tool to determine those pecuniary losses. 
Finally, the policy preference that damages should be determinable at 
the time of death can easily be modified to a policy that damages should be 
determined at the time of trial.  This policy modification is especially bene-
ficial because the effects of the death may be very useful in determining 
damages for loss of society.  Using this approach, the trial judge would be 
 
147. Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 222, 227 n.2 (Ct. App. 2006).  A benefici-
ary may recover economic damages, including financial support the decedent would have contrib-
uted to the family during: (1) either the life expectancy of the decedent or the life expectancy of 
the plaintiff, whichever is shorter; (2) the loss of gifts or benefits the plaintiff would have expected 
to receive from the decedent; (3)  funeral and burial expenses; and (4) the reasonable value of 
household services that the decedent would have provided). Riley v. California Erectors, Inc., 111 
Cal. Rptr. 459, 460 (Ct. App. 1973) (explaining that financial support is determined by calculating 
the present value of the earnings the decedent would have contributed to the family during the pe-
riod of that person’s life expectancy).  Powers v. Sutherland Auto Stage Co., 213 P. 494, 495 (Cal. 
1923) (holding mortality tables admissible to show the  probable duration of the decedent’s life).  
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Cerritos, Cal., on Aug. 31, 1986, 982 F.2d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 
1992) (noting that beneficiaries in a wrongful death action may submit a copy of the funeral bills 
to recover the reasonable value of funeral expenses). 
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authorized to admit evidence of the effects of the death on the beneficiary 
between the time of the death and the time of the trial. 
Therefore, courts should only retain the exclusionary rule in a limited 
form (in other words, a limited exclusionary rule) and eschew applying it to 
post-death evidence of the death’s effects on the beneficiaries.  If the courts 
apply a limited exclusionary rule instead of a general exclusionary rule, 
then the exclusionary rule will only exclude evidence of remarriage, death 
benefits, and other types of evidence that are relevant to the policy ration-
ales behind the exclusionary rule.  Other types of post-death evidence will 
then not be covered by the limited exclusionary rule.  The proper treatment 
of the other types of post-death evidence that are not covered by the exclu-
sionary rule in its limited form requires further exploration of the case law. 
V. THE GRIEF AND SUFFERING RULE 
The grief and suffering rule, generally speaking, provides that a wrong-
ful death plaintiff may not be awarded damages for grief and suffering over 
the loss of the decedent.  The grief and suffering rule is another rule that is 
mistakenly applied to exclude all post-death evidence and evidence of the 
death’s effects on the beneficiary when determining loss of society dam-
ages.148  Although initially the grief and suffering rule appears to exclude 
post-death evidence because some post-death evidence indicates grief and 
suffering, a critical difference exists between using evidence to measure 
loss of society damages and using that same evidence to measure grief and 
suffering damages.149  Furthermore, the law currently does not apply the 
grief and suffering rule to determine admissibility of post-death evidence 
because the result that would occur does not and never has occurred.150  
Thus, as this Part will show, the grief and suffering rule is inapposite to the 
issue of whether post-death evidence is admissible.151 
A. GRIEF DAMAGES AND LOSS OF SOCIETY DAMAGES CONTRASTED 
Although California case law specifically provides that loss of society 
damages are recoverable in a wrongful death action, California case law al-
so clearly specifies that compensation for grief, sorrow, or mental anguish 
is not recoverable.152  In California, there can be no recovery in a wrongful 
 
148. See infra notes 165-78 and accompanying text. 
149. See infra notes 152-63 and accompanying text. 
150. See infra note 177 and accompanying text. 
151. See infra notes 165-78 and accompanying text. 
152. Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1028 (Cal. 1977) (“California cases have uniformly 
held that damages for mental and emotional distress, including grief and sorrow, are not recover-
able in a wrongful death action.”); Dickinson v. S. Pac. Co., 158 P. 183, 185 (Cal. 1916); West-
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death action of “solatium for wounded feelings.”153  Solatium, sometimes 
called sentimental loss,154 is defined as: 
[A] compensation as a soothing to the affections or wounded feel-
ings, and for loss of the comfort and social pleasure there is in the 
association between members of a family, . . . solatium is senti-
ment, love, or affection, as distinguished from a property loss . . . 
and, as such, it is the very thing the law says shall not be al-
lowed.155 
In other words, a beneficiary’s grief or other mental suffering is not a 
proper element of damages.156  In Krouse v. Graham,157 the California Su-
preme Court also instructed that, in order to prevent jury confusion, discus-
sion of grief and suffering and discussion of loss of society and comfort 
should be separated for the jury.158 
Although damages for loss of society and damages for grief and suffer-
ing seem similar, they are actually quite different.  Principally, damages for 
loss of society are considered pecuniary damages and damages for grief and 
suffering are considered sentimental damages.159  The reason each is 
awarded most clearly distinguishes them: loss of society damages are 
awarded to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the decedent’s society 
while grief and suffering damages are awarded to console the plaintiff for 
the loss.160  One court aptly described the differences between the two: 
In addition to the direct financial benefits which heirs may rea-
sonably expect to receive from the continuance of the life of the 
deceased, there is that less tangible, and not so immediate, but 
nevertheless real, pecuniary benefit which often may reasonably be 
expected from a continuance of the “society, comfort, and protec-
 
field Ins. Co. v. DeSimone, 247 Cal. Rptr. 291, 295 (Ct. App. 1988); see Ellen S. Pryor, None-
conomic Damages, Suffering, and the Role of the Plaintiff’s Lawyer, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 563, 
563-76 (2006) (displaying a comprehensive discussion of grief and suffering damages). 
153. Dickinson, 158 P. at 185. 
154. Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 222, 226-27 (“A plaintiff . . . may not re-
cover for such things as the grief or sorrow attendant upon the death of a loved one, or for his sad 
emotions, or for the sentimental value of the loss.”). 
155. Marshall v. Consol. Jack Mines Co., 95 S.W. 972, 973 (Mo. Ct. App. 1906). 
156. Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1026. 
157. 562 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1977). 
158. Id. 
159. Compare Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1025 (“[A plaintiff can recover] ‘the pecuniary value of 
the society, comfort,  protection, and right to receive support, if any,’ which plaintiffs may have 
lost by reason of [the decedent’s] death.”), with Quiroz, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 226-27 (“A plain-
tiff . . . may not recover for such things as the grief or sorrow attendant upon the death of a loved 
one, or for his sad emotions, or for the sentimental value of the loss.”). 
160. See cases cited supra note 162. 
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tion” of the deceased . . . .  But while loss of society, comfort, and 
protection may be an element of the injury sustained by the statu-
tory beneficiaries, it is only the pecuniary, and not the sentimental, 
value of such loss which may be taken into consideration in the as-
sessment of damages.  Nothing can be recovered as a solatium for 
wounded feelings.  If the society of the deceased was of no finan-
cial value to the statutory beneficiaries, no damages can be 
awarded for its loss.161 
When a court values loss of society damages, the court focuses heavily 
on the pecuniary value that the decedent brought to the relationship.162  For 
example, one court noted that “the loss of a kind husband may be a consid-
erable pecuniary loss to a wife; she loses his advice and assistance in many 
matters of domestic economy.”163  As another example, the court noted that 
“the frugality, industry, usefulness, attention, and tender solicitude of a wife 
and the mother of children surely make her services greater than those of an 
ordinary servant, and therefore worth more.”164  This is distinct from award-
ing damages simply for the beneficiary’s sorrow because instead of focus-
ing on the beneficiary’s grief, the court focuses on the value that the dece-
dent’s services brought to the relationship. 
B. THE GRIEF AND SUFFERING RULE IS INAPPLICABLE TO LOSS OF 
SOCIETY DAMAGES 
The problem arises when it is contended that because post-death evi-
dence will likely include evidence—or the lack thereof—of grief and suf-
fering, post-death evidence is not admissible under the grief and suffering 
rule.  This argument is a fallacy because (1) the grief and suffering rule is 
not an evidentiary rule, it is a tort rule;165 (2) the post-death evidence is used 
to measure loss of society damages, not grief and suffering damages;166 and 
 
161. Griffey v. Pac. Elec. Ry. Co., 209 P. 45, 48-49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922). 
162. See, e.g., Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1025 (showing that a plaintiff can recover the pecuniary 
value of society, comfort, protection and the right to receive support); Cook v. Clay St. Hill R.R. 
Co., 60 Cal. 604, 604 (1882) (explaining that the plaintiff was allowed to testify about the rela-
tionship between herself and the decedent); Beeson v. Green Mountain Gold Mining Co., 57 Cal. 
20, 38-39 (1880) (displaying that the court focuses on the type of relationship between the party 
and decedent when determining pecuniary values). 
163. Beeson, 57 Cal. at 38. 
164. Id. at 39. 
165. Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1028; Dickinson v. S. Pac. Co., 158 P. 183, 185 (Cal. 1916); West-
field Ins. Co. v. DeSimone, 247 Cal. Rptr. 291, 295 (Ct. App. 1988).  Many California cases spec-
ify that grief and suffering is not recoverable in a wrongful death action. Id.  This is a tort rule be-
cause it specifies damages recoverable for a tort and it has been developed through common law. 
Id.  It is not a rule of evidence and is not found in any evidence codes. Id. 
166. See Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1026. 
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(3) the grief and suffering rule does not determine the admissibility of post-
death evidence because the result that would occur does not and never has 
occurred. 
First, the grief and suffering rule is not an evidentiary rule, it is a tort 
rule.167  The grief and suffering rule provides that damages are not awarded 
for grief and suffering in a wrongful death action in California.168  The grief 
and suffering rule does not prevent evidence of grief and suffering from ev-
er being admissible.  There is a difference between a rule that governs the 
recovery of damages and the admissibility of evidence.  A rule that governs 
the recovery of damages is a substantive rule of law, but a rule that governs 
the admissibility of evidence, in general, like the rule that excludes hearsay 
for example, is a rule of evidence.  Moreover, if evidence of grief and suf-
fering is admitted, it does not follow that damages for grief and suffering 
are awarded.  The beauty of the Federal Rule of Evidence 105 is that it pro-
vides that evidence may be admissible for some purposes and not for oth-
ers.169  Thus, it is possible to admit evidence of grief and suffering and oth-
er post-death evidence to measure loss of society damages but not allow 
that evidence to go to grief and suffering damages. 
Second, the grief and suffering rule is inapplicable to determine what 
evidence is admissible to measure loss of society damages because the post-
death evidence is used to measure loss of society damages, not grief and 
suffering damages.  Juries can be trusted to use evidence of grief and suffer-
ing and other types of post-death evidence to measure loss of society dam-
ages while not awarding additional damages for grief and suffering.170  In-
deed, the California Supreme Court in Krouse v. Graham implied that a 
jury may easily use evidence to measure loss of society and still exclude 
damages for grief and suffering when it stated that “a simple instruction ex-
cluding considerations of grief and sorrow in wrongful death actions will 
normally suffice.”171  Thus, the California Supreme Court appears to be-
lieve that a jury will not easily be confused when measuring loss of society 
and will successfully and justifiably refrain from awarding damages for 
grief and suffering.172  As such, the jury would understand the difference 
 
167. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
168. Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1028 (“California cases have uniformly held that damages for men-
tal and emotional distress, including grief and sorrow, are not recoverable in a wrongful death ac-
tion.”); Dickinson, 158 P. at 185; Westfield Ins. Co., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 295. 
169. FED. R. EVID. 105 (“When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one pur-
pose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon re-
quest, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”). 
170. Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1026. 
171. Id. at 1026. 
172. See id. 
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between awarding damages for grief and suffering and admitting evidence 
of the death’s effects on the beneficiary when measuring and then awarding 
damages for loss of society.  Furthermore, to prevent any residual jury con-
fusion, the judge should be required to instruct the jury on the proper use of 
the evidence and to explain to the jury the difference between grief and suf-
fering damages and loss of society damages.173 
Additionally, evidentiary law frequently provides that certain types of 
evidence are admissible for some uses but not for others.174  The Federal 
Rule of Evidence 105 allows the judge to give a limiting instruction to the 
jury restricting the evidence to its proper scope.175  For example, evidence 
of remarriage is admissible in order to impeach a witness, but not to deter-
mine loss of society because it is barred by the collateral source rationale.176  
Thus, because the legal system often relies upon juries to competently dis-
tinguish between the uses of different types of evidence, it is preposterous 
to argue that the jury could not do the same when considering post-death 
evidence. 
Third, if the grief and suffering rule did apply to post-death evidence, 
only post-death evidence of grief and suffering would be inadmissible while 
other post-death evidence not considered grief and suffering would be ad-
missible.  The law, however, has never stated that only certain types of 
post-death evidence are admissible while other types of post-death evidence 
are inadmissible.177  No court has applied a rule that would reach this result.  
Moreover, if the courts only applied the grief and suffering rule to post-
death evidence, any evidence of grief and suffering, which enhances dam-
ages, would be inadmissible.  Thus, the courts could only admit evidence 
that mitigates the plaintiff’s damages because evidence that would aggra-
vate the plaintiff’s damages would most likely relate to grief and suffering.  
This result would simply be unjust. 
For example, recall the story of Carolyn, the young mother who lost 
her infant daughter.  The post-death evidence in Carolyn’s story would not 
 
173. See David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating About Dol-
lars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1147-48 (2000) (explaining that assigning a 
dollar value with no standard to guide the awards leads to great variation in jury-determined com-
pensation).  There is no substitute for clear advice from a judge regarding coming to a jury verdict. 
Id.  When not provided with clear guidance to discipline their judgments, jurors have difficulty 
monetizing losses. Id. 
174. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 (stating that although evidence of character may only be 
used in limited circumstances, it may be used for impeachment). 
175. FED. R. EVID. 105 (“When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one pur-
pose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon re-
quest, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”). 
176. Rayner v. Ramirez, 324 P.2d 83, 90 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). 
177. McLaughlin v. United R.Rs. of S.F., 147 P. 149, 150 (Cal. 1915). 
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be admissible to aggravate her loss of society damages because her reaction 
to her daughter’s death, her depression, her therapy, and her divorce would 
be considered grief and suffering.  In contrast, if the grief and suffering rule 
were the only rule that applied to post-death evidence, Sophia’s reaction to 
her husband’s death would be admissible to mitigate her loss of society 
damages.  Her remarriage, death benefits, shopping spree, and lack of grief 
and suffering would all be admissible to mitigate her damages.  Coupled 
with a limited exclusionary rule rather than a broad exclusionary rule, the 
remarriage and the death benefits would not be admissible, while the shop-
ping spree would still be admissible because this evidence does not relate to 
grief and suffering.  Although it would be preferable, based on principles of 
justice and fairness, to admit the evidence of the shopping spree and lack of 
grief to mitigate Sophia’s loss of society damages, this rule would not admit 
Carolyn’s reaction to her daughter’s death.  Thus, the grief and suffering 
rule, if adopted as controlling on this issue, would not fit with notions of 
justice and fairness. 
Admitting post-death evidence, including any evidence that is indica-
tive of the beneficiary’s grief and suffering may appear to simply convert 
loss of society damages into grief and suffering damages.  However, this 
argument strains credulity because the purpose for awarding the damages 
does not change; its goal remains to compensate, not to console.  The court 
would continue to measure the pecuniary value of the services and society 
that the decedent offered the beneficiary, using as much evidence as possi-
ble to best measure loss of society. 
Finally, to reiterate, the grief and suffering rule cannot be applied to the 
issue of admitting post-death evidence because (1) the grief and suffering 
rule is not an evidentiary rule, it is a tort rule, (2) post-death evidence is 
used to measure loss of society damages, not grief and suffering damages, 
and (3) no courts come to the conclusion that some of Sophia’s evidence 
would be admitted while none of Carolyn’s evidence would be admitted, 
yet this is the practical effect if the grief and suffering rule were the appli-
cable rule.178 
VI. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EFFECTS OF THE DEATH ON THE 
BENEFICIARIES:  CONSIDERING THE FUTURE 
Thus, neither the broad exclusionary rule nor the grief and suffering 
rule apply to post-death evidence of the death’s effects when calculating 
 
178. See McClurg, supra note 19, at 26 (describing the grief that one suffers after death of a 
loved one). 
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loss of society damages.179  Although the exclusionary rule provides ample 
justification for excluding evidence of remarriage, engagement to remarry, 
post-death affairs, and death benefits such as social security benefits or 
property received, post-death evidence of the death’s effects on the benefi-
ciaries is not covered under the rule when calculating loss of society.  Fur-
thermore, the grief and suffering rule does not exclude post-death evidence 
because it does not separately award compensation for grief and suffering; 
rather, the post-death evidence is utilized to determine loss of society dam-
ages.  Finally, post-death evidence of the death’s effects on the beneficiaries 
may both mitigate and aggravate damages for loss of society, depending on 
how the death affects the beneficiaries. 
Thus, although both the grief and suffering rule and the exclusionary 
rule appear to apply to the problem under consideration, neither provides 
guidance.  In addition, very little case law discusses specifically whether 
evidence of the death’s effects on the beneficiary is admissible outside of 
the context of the grief and suffering rule or the exclusionary rule.  Indeed, 
the little case law that does exist comes to conflicting decisions.180 
A. THE PROBLEM:  LACK OF CONTROLLING AUTHORITY AND A 
UNIFORM TEST 
Because neither the limited exclusionary rule nor the grief and suffer-
ing rule apply directly to all types of post-death evidence, it is prudent to 
search beyond the case law discussing the rules to determine if other con-
trolling authority exists.  Very little case law, however, specifically dis-
cusses the issue of admissibility of post-death evidence outside of the con-
text of the exclusionary rule or the grief and suffering rule.  The following 
cases are the most relevant, but these cases demonstrate that courts are di-
vided on this issue. 
In Canavin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines,181 decedent’s wife and chil-
dren brought a wrongful death action for their husband and father’s death in 
a plane crash.182  The plaintiffs argued that the court should allow them to 
present evidence of the effects of their loss.183  The court refused and gave 
the following analysis: 
 
179. See supra Parts IV-V. 
180. See, e.g., Canavin v. Pac. Sw. Airlines, 196 Cal. Rptr. 82, 106 (Ct. App. 1983); Moniz 
v. Bettencourt, 76 P.2d 535, 539-40 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938). 
181. 196 Cal. Rptr. 82 (Ct. App. 1983). 
182. Canavin, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 85. 
183. Id. at 85-86. 
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Rather, the measure of damages [in a wrongful death action] is the 
value of the benefits the heirs could reasonably expect to receive 
from the deceased if [he or] she had lived . . . .  In other words, it 
is the probable value of the decedent’s life to those for whom the 
action is brought . . . .  It does not include the value of the inde-
pendent, non-derivative effects of the loss of the decedent upon the 
heirs.184 
In contrast, in Moniz v. Bettencourt,185 a California appellate court held 
that evidence of the effects upon a child of the loss of his mother is admis-
sible.186  In this case, two minor sons brought a wrongful death action for 
the loss of their mother.187  During the trial, the judge asked a witness how 
the mother’s death affected one of the sons.188  The judge overruled the de-
fendant’s objection: 
The court feels it does affect the measure of damages, and if the 
child is grief stricken, which the court does not undertake to say 
whether he is or is not, but you may state what you observed in re-
gard to the child before and after the death of the mother, if there 
is any difference, I don’t know.189 
The court noted that the witness’ answer “did not go to the mental suf-
fering or grief incurred by the death of the mother” but rather “would tend 
to show that the children were not so much grief stricken as they missed the 
care and comfort of their mother during the night.”190  Finally, the court 
found it persuasive that the jury was instructed properly regarding the ele-
ments of damages.191 
In Meek v. Department of Transportation,192 a wrongful death action 
similar to Moniz v. Bettencourt, another court found post-death evidence 
admissible.193  The plaintiff brought a wrongful death action for the loss of 
her husband in a traffic accident.194  She alleged that the “defendant failed 
to design, construct and maintain the highway so that it was reasonably safe 
and convenient for public travel.”195  The plaintiff prevailed, and the defen-
 
184. Id. at 86 (emphasis added). 
185. 76 P.2d 535 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938). 
186. Moniz, 76 P.2d at 539-40. 
187. Id. at 536. The administrator of the estate brought the suit on the sons’ behalf. Id. 
188. Id. at 539-40. 
189. Id. at 539. 
190. Id. at 539-40. 
191. Id. 
192. 610 N.W.2d 250 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000). 
193. Id. at 259. 
194. Id. at 253. 
195. Id. at 253-54. 
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dant appealed the damages awarded.196  The appellate court held that the 
evidence in totality provided sufficient support for the trial court’s award of 
damages.197  The court first described the husband and wife’s relationship 
prior to the death.198  The court noted: 
There was evidence of a close relationship between Suzanne and 
Meek over a six-year period.  The couple traveled together on va-
cations, bowled in several leagues, fished together, and grocery 
shopped together.  According to Suzanne, they ‘were together all 
the time.’  Meek did the larger portion of the household chores for 
the couple.  The family was close.199 
The court then described the plaintiff’s life after her husband’s death, 
and stated, “Suzanne testified about her difficulties since Meek’s death, her 
stress, psychological counseling, medication, work absences, depression, 
and her sense of personal loss.”200  This court thus found a need to consider 
both pre-death evidence and post-death evidence in measuring loss of soci-
ety damages.201 
Much like the divided case law on the issue, statutory law also fails to 
provide clear guidance.202  California’s governing wrongful death statute 
simply provides that “damages may be awarded that, under all the circum-
stances of the case, may be just.”203  Interestingly, other jurisdictions have 
found that post-death evidence is admissible when damages are sought un-
der a statute similar to the California statute.204  For example, an Illinois 
court found that, in a wrongful death action brought by a widow pregnant at 
the time the decedent died, it was proper to admit evidence that subse-
quently the child was born and died.205  This demonstrates that some post-
death evidence is admissible under a wrongful death statute similar to Cali-
fornia’s.206 
 






202. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377(a) (West 2004). 
203. Id. 
204. See, e.g., Preble v. Wabash R. Co., 90 N.E. 716, 717 (Ill. 1909) (“This view is in conso-
nance with the statute that gives the action, and which provides that such damages shall be given 
as are a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting from the death to the wife 
and next of kin of the deceased person . . . and it was not error to permit proof of the facts that a 
child was born and died subsequent to the death of the deceased.”). 
205. Id. 
206. See id. 
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Thus, determining the admissibility of post-death evidence to measure 
loss of society damages is not nearly as simplistic as it might appear.  
Courts confuse the issue and apply inapposite doctrines to the question of 
whether post-death evidence is admissible.207  The courts that do recognize 
these problems come to conflicting decisions based on policy rationales, 
fairness, and justice perhaps because no bright-line rule or framework exists 
to help courts understand these issues.208  These evidentiary issues are com-
plex and little has been done to address them.  A bright-line rule or frame-
work should be created to help courts apply a uniform doctrine governing 
the admissibility of post-death evidence. 
B. THE BEST WAY TO MEASURE LOSS: A NUANCED RULE THAT 
LOOKS AT THE WHOLE PICTURE 
Courts should adopt a rule that allows measurement of loss of society 
in a more nuanced approach.  Clearly, a hard-line rule that admits no post-
death evidence is inconsistent with principles of justice and fairness.  The 
McLaughlin court stated that “[i]t is certainly extremely illogical to admit 
certain evidence and refuse consideration to other evidence of like character 
tending equally to establish the controverted issue, namely, the amount of 
damage sustained.”209  However, evidence law frequently distinguishes be-
tween different types of evidence tending equally to establish the contro-
verted issue.210  Considering the complexity of the law, courts inevitably 
will make these distinctions.  However, distinguishing between types of 
evidence is not the problem.  Rather, the problem is that courts distinguish 
between post-death evidence without the aid of a framework or rule that as-
sists them in reaching consistent decisions on this subject. 
When setting forth a new framework, courts should consider several 
factors.  First, the admissibility of post-death evidence of the death’s effects 
on the beneficiaries is a question for the judge.211  Federal Rule of Evidence 
104(a) provides that “[p]reliminary questions concerning the qualification 
of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility 
 
207. See Cherrigan v. City & County of S.F., 69 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48 (Ct. App. 1968); Benwell 
v. Dean, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394, 402-03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). 
208. See Canavin v. Pac. Sw. Airlines, 196 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85 (Ct. App. 1983); Cherrigan, 69 
Cal. Rptr. at 48; Benwell, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 402-03; Moniz v. Bettencourt, 76 P.2d 535, 539-40 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1938). 
209. McLaughlin v. United R.Rs. of S.F., 147 P. 149, 150 (Cal. 1915). 
210. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 405(b) (provides that opinion evidence and reputation evidence but 
not specific instances of conduct may be used as character evidence). 
211. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
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of evidence shall be determined by the court.”212  The admissibility of post-
death evidence is thus a preliminary question for the judge while the post-
death evidence’s effect on the determination of damages is a question for 
the jury.213  Because the judge determines whether the evidence is admissi-
ble, the threshold test that determines admissibility may be relatively com-
plex.  However, judges can competently apply a nuanced and factor-based 
rule when determining admissibility of evidence.  Thus, the framework go-
verning admissibility of post-death evidence of the death’s effects need not 
focus heavily on ensuring ease in making this determination, as would be 
the case if the jury made this determination. 
Second, the preference for a hard-line rule does not comport with the 
nuanced approach taken by evidence codes.  Rather, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and other evidence codes214 provide standards for courts to apply, 
but do not generally provide hard-line standards.215  For example, the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence is replete with language instructing courts to apply 
nuanced balancing tests.216  Furthermore, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
rarely state definitively that a certain piece of evidence is either admissible 
or inadmissible; rather, the rules describe the evidence and provide rules 
based on its character.  For example, evidence is described in terms of 
whether it is relevant, hearsay, or privileged, and relatively complex legal 
standards determine whether the evidence qualifies as such.217 
Third, because all damages awarded must be proximately caused by the 
tortious conduct, courts will automatically exclude some post-death evi-
dence that was not related to the proximate cause of the harm.  This allevi-
ates the criticism that some post-death evidence is too remote and not de-
serving of consideration when determining damages.  In Simoneau v. 
 
212. Id.  Preliminary questions include any of the following: “[i]s the alleged expert a quali-
fied physician?  Is a witness whose former testimony is offered unavailable?  Was a stranger pre-
sent during a conversation between attorney and client?”  FED. R. EVID. 104(a) advisory commit-
tee’s notes.  “In each instance the admissibility of evidence will turn upon the answer to the 
question of the existence of the condition.  Accepted practice, incorporated in the rule, places on 
the judge the responsibility for these determinations.” Id. (citations omitted). 
213. FED. R. EVID. 104(a)-(b). 
214. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE; LA. CODE EVID. 
215. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence.”); FED. R. EVID. 609 (recognizing that the admissibility of a criminal 
conviction is dependent on whether the elements of the crime required proof or admission of an 
act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness, whether the criminal conviction is being used 
against a criminally accused, whether the court determines that the probative value of admitting 
the criminal conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused, whether a period of more 
than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness.). 
216. See FED. R. EVID. 609. 
217. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401; FED. R. EVID. 801; FED. R. EVID. 501. 
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Pacific Electric Co.,218 the California Supreme Court held that the subse-
quent misfortunes and impaired physical condition of the widow and chil-
dren of the deceased had no bearing on the damages recoverable, because 
several years had elapsed between the death of the deceased and trial.219  
The court reasoned that “[c]hanged conditions in the family of the de-
ceased, adverse circumstances, or misfortunes in the way of sickness, which 
are in no way connected with or related to the death of the deceased, but 
occur subsequently thereto, are not matters for which the defendant is re-
sponsible and are inadmissible for any purpose.”220  Because the doctrine of 
proximate cause remains applicable to damage awards, a new proposal need 
not concern itself with the unjust result that the California Supreme Court 
avoided in Simoneau. 
Fourth, loss of society damages are measured differently from pecuni-
ary losses and as such, deserve a more complex method of measurement of 
these damages.221  Loss of society is more than a pecuniary loss; instead, it 
is loss of the society a loved one previously gave to the survivor.222  It 
should be compensated as such.223  As a result of these distinctions, courts 
should compensate for loss of society differently from the methods in which 
pecuniary losses are compensated.  Pecuniary losses take less time to meas-
ure because, for example, it is sufficient to bring into evidence the cost of a 
funeral, and that cost represents the value that the beneficiary must be com-
 
218. 136 P. 544 (Cal. 1913). 
219. Simoneau v. Pac. Elec. Co., 136 P. 544, 549-50 (Cal. 1913). 
220. Id. 
221. Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 222, 227 n.2 (Ct. App. 2006).  A benefici-
ary may recover economic damages, including financial support the decedent would have contrib-
uted to the family during either the life expectancy of the decedent or the life expectancy of the 
plaintiff, whichever is shorter; the loss of gifts or benefits the plaintiff would have expected to re-
ceive from the decedent; funeral and burial expenses; and the reasonable value of household ser-
vices that the decedent would have provided. Id.; Riley v. Cal. Erectors, Inc., 111 Cal. Rptr. 459, 
460 (Ct. App. 1973) (noting that financial support is determined by calculating the present value 
of the earnings the decedent would have contributed to the family during the period of that per-
son’s life expectancy.); Powers v. Sutherland Auto Stage Co., 213 P. 494, 495 (Cal. 1923) (stating 
that mortality tables are admissible evidence to show the  probable duration of the decedent’s 
life.); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Cerritos, Cal., on Aug. 31, 1986, 982 F.2d 1271, 1276 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (explaining that beneficiaries in a wrongful death action may submit a copy of the fu-
neral bills to recover the reasonable value of funeral expenses.); Fagerquist v. W. Sun Aviation, 
Inc., 236 Cal. Rptr. 633, 644-45 (Ct. App. 1987) (stating, in contrast, that noneconomic damages 
are not as easily calculable).  A reviewing court has no fixed yardstick to measure the value of 
these elements of damage. Fagerquist, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 644-45. It is sufficient if the amount 
awarded appears to bear a reasonable relation to the elements of loss entitled to be considered by 
the jury. Id. 
222. McClurg, supra note 19, at 22-23, 26. 
223. In re Air Crash Disaster, 982 F.2d at 1278.  An award for future earnings is a proper 
component of pecuniary damages. Id.  As such, the future is taken into consideration to determine 
pecuniary damages. Id.  Thus, the future should also be taken into consideration when determining 
nonpecuniary damages. Id. 
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pensated.224  But loss of society is more than simply a pecuniary loss and 
must be measured using more of a nuanced approach. 
Lastly, the California statute that governs wrongful death law provides 
that “in an action under this article, damages may be awarded that, under all 
the circumstances of the case, may be just . . . .”225  Thus, the California 
legislature specifically acknowledges that a hard-line rule should not apply, 
but rather the courts should consider the most fair and just way to measure 
wrongful death damages.226  The broad statutory language suggests that a 
more nuanced approach is preferable.  Furthermore, the law on this matter 
would benefit from a nuanced approach and framework outlining the 
court’s various considerations when determining a question of admissibility 
of post-death evidence. 
C. PROPOSAL:  THE NEW POST-DEATH EVIDENCE RULE 
The courts should consider adopting the following rule.  First, courts 
should generally admit all post-death evidence if it is relevant to determine 
loss of society damages.  The courts should primarily consider the issue of 
relevance when making this preliminary admissibility determination.  Sec-
ond, three exceptions to this rule should be articulated.  The first exception 
is the collateral source exception: the defendant may not use post-death evi-
dence to benefit from his or her tortious conduct.  For example, remarriage, 
a new birth, or a post-death affair is inadmissible under this exception.  The 
second exception is the speculation exception: if the defendant offers evi-
dence to mitigate damages and that evidence requires the fact-finder to spe-
culatively compare the replacement of the beneficiary’s loss, the evidence is 
inadmissible.  The Benwell court noted that “the surviving spouse’s remar-
riage is highly speculative, because it involves a comparison of the prospec-
tive earnings, services, and contributions of the deceased spouse with those 
of the new spouse.”227  If the defendant seeks to admit post-death evidence 
involving a similar speculative comparison, the court should not admit this 
evidence.  The third exception is the grief and suffering exception: if the 
fact-finder is considering post-death evidence related to the grief and suffer-
ing of the beneficiaries, the court should apply a balancing test and should 
not admit the evidence if its probative value of the beneficiary’s grief and 
suffering is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice to the tortfeasor. 
 
224. Id. at 1276.  Beneficiaries in a wrongful death action may submit a copy of the funeral 
bills to recover the reasonable value of funeral expenses. Id. 
225. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.61 (West 2004). 
226. See id. 
227. Benwell v. Dean, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394, 402 (Ct. App. 1967). 
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The court should admit all relevant post-death evidence unless exclud-
able under these exceptions because this evidence provides a more accurate 
determination of loss of society damages.  The principle goal of tort law is 
to provide compensation.228  “The fundamental principle of damages is to 
restore the injured party, as nearly as possible, to the position he would 
have been in had it not been for the wrong of the other party.”229  Indeed, 
one court noted: 
The true question is: what had these plaintiffs the right to expect to 
receive from the parent during his life?  And for the loss of this 
they are to be compensated.  What they got after his death does not 
enter into the case.  The loss spoken of is the taking away of that 
which they were receiving, and would have received had he lived.  
It is the destruction of their expectations in this regard that the law 
deals with, and for which it furnished compensation.230 
The courts should consider as much evidence as possible in order to provide 
the most accurate compensation as possible.231 
 
228. Strebel v. Brenlar Invs., Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 699, 706 (Ct. App. 2006) (“Tort damages 
are awarded to fully compensate the victim for all the injury suffered.”); Barrett v. Superior Court, 
272 Cal. Rptr. 304, 308 (Ct. App. 1990) (“There are three distinct public policy considerations 
involved in the legislative creation of a cause of action for wrongful death: ‘(1) compensation for 
survivors, (2) deterrence of conduct and (3) limitation, or lack thereof, upon the damages recover-
able.’” (internal citation omitted)).  Whether the tort system accurately compensates for losses or 
wrongs, however, is hotly debated.  Because the goal of tort law is compensation, the law has fo-
cused on making the plaintiff whole.  Some argue that the legal system has achieved this goal re-
markably well.  However, many still question whether the legal system compensates plaintiffs ac-
curately.  Some argue that because the transactional costs of litigation (e.g. attorneys’ fees) are so 
high that plaintiffs sometimes only receive fifty percent of their reward, the system has failed to 
compensate accurately.  See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” 
Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 449-50 (2006) (discussing litigation as an expensive way to 
spread loss).  Some argue that the result of the collateral source rule results in plaintiffs receiving 
more than sufficient compensation, sometimes even double compensation. Id. at 486-87.  Some 
argue that the legal system should abolish recovery for pain and suffering because there is no way 
to accurately measure and quantify a plaintiff’s pain and suffering.  See Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain 
and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 164-65 
(2004) (proposing an elimination of recovery for pain and suffering).  Still others argue that the 
law of wrongful death should allow recovery for hedonic damages (damages for loss of enjoyment 
of life)).  See Erin Ann O’Hara, Hedonic Damages for Wrongful Death: Are Tortfeasors Getting 
Away With Murder?, 78 GEO. L.J. 1687, 1687-88 (1990) (arguing hedonic damages would deter 
negligent behavior more adequately).  Contra Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 51, at 1044-70 
(discussing the problems associated with hedonic damages).  This is by no means an exhaustive 
list; there are many arguments for and against tort reform.  What is important is that the tort sys-
tem is under momentous change and debate every day. 
229. United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958). 
230. McLaughlin v. United R.Rs. of S.F., 147 P. 149, 151 (Cal. 1915) (citation omitted). 
231. For example, many argue that if a decedent dies while in prison, the beneficiaries suffer 
less of a loss of society.  The courts may admit this evidence to go to loss of society.  Thus, the 
courts should also admit other evidence that will accurately depict loss of society. 
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Generally, logic and experience determines relevance.232  As one court 
has commented, “[n]o precise or universal test of relevancy is furnished by 
law.  The question must be determined in each case according to the teach-
ings of reason and judicial experience.”233  The test of relevancy is “wheth-
er . . . the evidence tends logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference” 
to prove or disprove a material issue.234  The courts should consider wheth-
er the post-death evidence has any bearing on the decedent’s “society, com-
panionship, love, affection, consortium, marital services, marital care, aid, 
tutelage, support, moral upbringing, experience, knowledge, cooperation, 
solicitude, comfort, pleasure, household services, guidance, advice, counsel, 
kindly offices, training, education, . . . assistance, attention, care, and pro-
tection.”235  The standard of relevance is a very broad standard in evidence 
law.236  As such, most post-death evidence is relevant, and thus preliminar-
ily admissible under this framework. 
The exceptions will then limit the types of admissible post-death evi-
dence.  The exceptions are divided by whether they tend to mitigate or ag-
gravate damages.  The first two exceptions, collateral source and specula-
tion, are fairly simple to understand given the policy considerations set 
forth for the exclusionary rule.237  The last exception, grief and suffering, is 
more contestable.  Courts should admit most evidence of grief and suffer-
ing, however, in order to aggravate loss of society damages.238  This evi-
dence is relevant because it indicates the society that the decedent provided 
to the beneficiary.  As one professor has noted, “[w]e grieve what we val-
ue . . . .  We grieve in proportion to our affection.”239  A person who has 
provided more comfort, care, society, and companionship will be grieved 
more than a person who has provided less.240  Furthermore, the fact-finder 
should consider evidence of the relationship before the loss and then after 
the loss to determine damages.  Similarly, in determining economic loss, 
the fact-finder must both consider the amount the plaintiff possessed before 
 
232. Moody v. Peirano, 88 P. 380, 382 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1906). 
233. Id. 
234. People v. Slocum, 125 Cal. Rptr. 442, 456 (Ct. App. 1975). 
235. McClurg, supra note 19, at 26. 
236. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (stating that evidence is relevant if it aids in weighting the evi-
dence). 
237. See supra Part IV.C. 
238. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note (explaining the exception that 
provides that most evidence of grief and suffering will be admissible under this rule because this 
standard errs on the side of admissibility). 
239. McClurg, supra note 19, at 14. 
240. See id. (suggesting that the amount of grief a person feels is directly proportionate to the 
amount of care that person has invested in the one he or she is grieving for). 
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the loss and after the loss, because only then can the fact-finder truly deter-
mine the amount of damages to be awarded. 
This context-specific rule, however, invites the criticism that it lacks 
coherence because people deal with grief over loss of a loved one in differ-
ent ways, much to the chagrin of courts and juries attempting to measure 
wrongful death damages.  Perhaps it is surprising to some that grief suffer-
ers have more in common than they might imagine.241  Grief experts can 
detail the many stages of grief, which are experienced in a very particular 
manner.242  Moreover, a person grieves in proportion to his or her affection, 
making this a much more worthwhile and much less difficult determina-
tion.243  Even still, denying consideration to all post-death evidence only 
exacerbates the problem because, without adequate evidence, the fact-finder 
cannot make an accurate measurement.  Finally, the beneficiary usually de-
scribes his or her grief experience while on the stand, thus making the bene-
ficiary’s description of his or her loss a credibility determination.  This cre-
dibility determination is best given to the jury or other finder of fact that has 
the opportunity to view and form an opinion about the witness.244 
Anecdotally, this proposal yields the most just results for Carolyn and 
Sophia.245  All of the evidence relevant to Carolyn’s story will be admissi-
ble, unless the trial judge finds that the probative value of the evidence is 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.  The analysis of Carolyn’s 
case will start with the general rule that any relevant evidence is admissi-
ble.246  The trial judge will find that the evidence of Carolyn’s depression, 
suicide attempts, divorce, and therapy related to her daughter’s death is re-
levant to a determination of loss of society damages.  The trial judge will 
exclude any evidence that the driver of the car did not proximately cause.  
The driver’s tortious conduct proximately caused Carolyn’s depression, sui-
cide attempts, divorce, and therapy, and thus they are relevant to determin-
ing loss of society.  Then, because this evidence will aggravate damages, 
 
241. McClurg, supra note 19, at 17. 
242. Id. at 14.  See ELIZABETH KÜBLER-ROSS, ON DEATH AND DYING 34-99 (1969) (dis-
cussing the five stages of coping in terminally ill patients).  Kübler-Ross focused on grief stages in 
dying people, but the same multiple-stage analysis is also applied to survivors of lost loved ones.  
See BROOK NOEL & PAMELA D. BLAIR, I WASN’T READY TO SAY GOODBYE: SURVIVING, 
COPING & HEALING AFTER THE SUDDEN DEATH OF A LOVED ONE 47-57 (2000) (discussing the 
grief stages in people who have lost loved ones to sudden death and attributing the analysis to 
Kübler-Ross). 
243. McClurg, supra note 19, at 14. 
244. People v. Upsher, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 481, 490 (Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]he credibility of wit-
nesses and the weight to be accorded to the evidence are matters exclusively within the province 
of the trier of fact.”). 
245. See supra Part II (discussing the hypothetical stories of Carolyn and Sophia). 
246. FED. R. EVID. 402. 
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the remaining determination centers on whether the evidence is substan-
tially outweighed by unfair prejudice.  Under the proposed guidelines, the 
trial judge will likely find that this evidence is not substantially outweighed 
by unfair prejudice because it is a typical form of grief and directly resulted 
from the defendant’s tortious conduct. 
Sophia’s story is slightly different.  The judge will admit Sophia’s lack 
of grief and heavy spending but will not admit evidence of the death bene-
fits she received or her new marriage.  The trial judge will first determine 
whether the evidence is relevant.247  The broad relevance standard will dic-
tate that the trial judge find evidence of Sophia’s behavior following the 
death of her husband relevant.  Then the trial judge will apply the specula-
tion exception and the collateral source exception to the evidence.  The 
judge will not admit evidence of Sophia’s remarriage under the speculation 
exception.  The judge will also not admit evidence of Sophia’s death bene-
fits under the collateral source exception.  The judge will admit the rest of 
the evidence relevant to loss of society.  The results in both Carolyn and 
Sophia’s stories comport with standards of fairness and justice and are the 
most desirable outcomes because they accurately compensate Carolyn and 
Sophia for their respective noneconomic losses. 
D. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A HIGHLY INDIVIDUATED APPROACH 
There is no doubt that this post-death evidence rule is very context-
specific and focuses heavily on the individualized facts of the case.  This is 
the favorable approach to take, however, because it achieves optimal deter-
rence to potential tortfeasors as well as full compensation to the plaintiff in 
an already context-specific tort system using the most efficient means pos-
sible.248 
The post-death evidence rule achieves optimal deterrence while provid-
ing just compensation to the beneficiaries.  Professors Posner and Sunstein 
note that in tort law and administrative law, “a pervasive question is how to 
combine accuracy with administrability.”249  They explicate: 
A simple and uniform number, accompanied by blanket exclusions 
of values that are hard to calculate, might well be simplest to ad-
minister—and regulatory policy generally takes this approach.  In 
addition, an effort at greater accuracy might invite interest-group 
maneuvering; a uniform number provides a degree of insulation 
against special pleading.  But if full compensation and optimal de-
 
247. See FED. R. EVID. 401-402. 
248. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 38, at 540. 
249. Id. 
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terrence are the goals, then a high degree of individuation should 
be expected, tailoring dollar amounts to the precise circumstances 
of mortality risks.  Suppose for example, that both regulators and 
courts possessed “hedometers,” costlessly able to calculate the an-
ticipated or actual loss, to all, from every human death.  If he-
dometers were available, courts could ensure perfectly accurate 
compensation, and both courts and regulators would bring about 
optimal deterrence, attuned to individual circumstances.250 
The proposed post-death evidence rule functions like the hedometer in 
Professor Posner and Sunstein’s hypothetical because it ensures just com-
pensation by measuring the loss as accurately as possible.  It also accurately 
measures the loss of society the beneficiaries suffer using the most efficient 
means possible.  Furthermore, the proposed post-death evidence rule takes 
an individuated approach in a system that already takes the particular char-
acteristics of an individual into account when contextualizing the cost of 
life.251  It does not alter the foundations of the current tort system; rather, it 
furthers the policies and goals of a system with which it is already consis-
tent.  The beauty and simplicity of the proposed post-death evidence rule is 
this consistency.  Professors Posner and Sunstein have conducted research 
on wrongful death awards,252 and have discovered that “in principle, the law 
calls for a highly individuated approach, one that recognizes a wide range 
 
250. Id. at 540-41 (emphasis added); see F.Y. EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS: AN 
ESSAY ON THE APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICS TO THE MORAL SCIENCES 101 (London, C. Ke-
gan Paul & Co. 1881) (comparing the idea of a hedometer with the idea of a hedonimeter and as-
suming throughout that utility can be measured scientifically with such a device).  For those who 
are skeptical of utilitarian approaches, substitute the term “eudaimeters,” based on the Greek no-
tion of eudaimonia, establishing a more complex notion of well-being. See also MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND 
PHILOSOPHY 343-72 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1986) (discussing eudaimonia). 
251. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 38, at 548-49. 
252. Id. at 545-46.  Professors Posner and Sunstein used verdict and settlement data to at-
tempt to predict what wrongful death damages will be in any particular case. Id.  They “examined 
data from two data sets: (1) an unscientific Jury Verdict and Settlements (JVS) data set that pro-
vides a wealth of information about the characteristics of the cases; and (2) a more scientific Civil 
Justice Survey (CJS) data set that contains little information about the characteristics of cases, and 
does not isolate damages on account of death.” Id. at 546.  They “took the original award, and 
then deducted amounts that appeared to reflect punitive damages, damages for pain and suffering 
of the victim prior to death, medical expenses, and funeral expenses . . .  in order to isolate the im-
plicit valuation of the loss of life itself.” Id.  “The remainder is thus chiefly after-death losses to 
dependents, both economic and noneconomic.” Id.  In the Jury Verdict and Settlements data set, 
the mean award for loss of life was $3.1 million, and the median was $1.1 million. Id. at 548.  
This was consistent with the findings of the Civil Justice Survey data set, in which the mean was 
$3,759,000 and the median was $961,000 for a sample of cases from 2001. Id.  Professors Posner 
and Sunstein concluded that “the tort system generally values lost lives at well under $3 million, 
and about half the time under $1 million.” Id.  They also concluded that the considerable variance 
in both data sets supports the general proposition that damages awards have a degree of arbitrari-
ness. Id. 
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of factors that bear on the degree of loss to dependents.”253  Nevertheless, 
many oppose an individuated tort system.  Hence, the benefits of an indi-
viduated tort system must be examined. 
The opposition to an individuated tort system advances the following 
arguments: (1) an individuated system prevents ease of administration, and 
thus, the tort system should adopt the regulatory-like process that assigns a 
uniform value to lives in lieu of the current individuated tort system;254 (2) 
an individuated approach has high transaction costs and thus lacks judicial 
efficiency; and (3) the individuated approach of the proposed post-death 
evidence rule is too context-specific and lacks coherence. 
First, the opposition may argue that an individuated system prevents 
ease of administration, and thus, the tort system should adopt the regula-
tory-like process that assigns a uniform value to lives in lieu of the current 
individuated tort system.255  Regulatory agencies attempt to reduce statisti-
cal risks of death.256  To do so, agencies reduce human lives to monetary 
equivalents by calculating the risk someone is willing to pay to avoid a risk 
and then by performing a cost-benefit analysis.257  Essentially, agencies 
award hedonic damages, i.e. damages for loss of life’s pleasure.258  But Pro-
fessors Posner and Sunstein argue instead that the regulatory system’s use 
of a uniform value for loss of life makes little sense as a deterrence function 
and that agencies instead should adopt the tort system’s inclusion of emo-
tional distress and other welfare losses that the dependents incurred in 
measuring damages.259  They give two reasons for this argument.  The first 
is that people will assign very different values to statistically identical 
risks.260  In other words, people assign different risk values and thus have 
 
253. Id. at 548-49. 
254. Id. at 540-41 (“A simple and uniform number, accompanied by blanket exclusions of 
values that are hard to calculate, might well be simplest to administer – and regulatory policy gen-
erally takes this approach.”). 
255. Id. 
256. Id. at 538.  Those agencies use a cost benefit analysis to do so.  See also STEPHEN G. 
BREYER, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND 
CASES 125-27, 135 (Aspen Law & Bus. 5th ed. 2002) (describing President Clinton’s Executive 
Order 12866, which requires agencies to analyze both quantitative and qualitative costs and bene-
fits of any new regulations that might be pursued). 
257. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 38, at 538. 
258. Id. at 544 (recognizing that courts do not award hedonic damages, “[p]laintiffs suing on 
behalf of a victim who has no future income, no dependents, no spouse, and who dies without 
feeling pain, should ordinarily receive zero damages or damages sufficient only to cover funeral 
expenses.”). 
259. Id. at 542. 
260. Id. at 566; see Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 962-74 (1999) (noting that factors 
such as whether the risk is voluntary or involuntary, the nature of the death risked, and whether 
the death is slow and lingering or instantaneous will all affect the value of the statistical life for 
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different values for a statistical life for risks such as death from lung cancer, 
car crashes, plane crashes, strokes, and Alzheimer’s disease.261  The second 
reason is that individuals assign different values of a statistical life based on 
the individual’s nature, an individual’s differences in risk aversion or incli-
nation, and differences in wealth and income.262  Professors Posner and 
Sunstein conclude that variable values make far more sense than uniform 
ones.263  Thus, contrary to the opponent’s position, adopting a system that 
awards uniform values for loss of life, while making a tort system more 
administrable, fails to provide deterrence, which is the principle goal of tort 
law along with compensation.264 
Second, although the proposed method of measuring damages is not 
costless because it still requires judicial time and public funds, our current 
tort system already requires judicial time and public funds.  This under-
mines the criticism that the proposed post-death evidence rule usurps court 
time.  Thus, the post-death evidence rule is almost costless because it does 
not necessitate a cost that does not already exist.  The post-death evidence 
rule does not change the efficiency of our current judicial system with re-
spect to wrongful death cases.  Therefore, because this individualized post-
death evidence rule is most favorable given public policies of deterrence, 
compensation, and efficiency, the transaction costs of an individualized tort 
system need not be given great weight.265 
 
equally likely risks); see James Hammitt and Jin-Tan Liu, Effects of Disease Type and Latency on 
the Value of Mortality Risk, 28 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 73, 82-90 (2004) (finding an “almost 
significant” tendency toward higher willingness-to-pay to avoid cancer rather than noncancerous 
diseases). 
261. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 38, at 566-67. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. at 566-68. 
264. Strebel v. Brenlar Invs., Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 699, 706 (Ct. App. 2006) (“Tort damages 
are awarded to fully compensate the victim for all the injury suffered.”);  Barrett v. Superior 
Court, 272 Cal. Rptr. 304, 308 (Ct. App. 1990) (“There are three distinct public policy considera-
tions involved in the legislative creation of a cause of action for wrongful death: ‘(1) compensa-
tion for survivors, (2) deterrence of conduct, and (3) limitation, or lack thereof, upon the damages 
recoverable.’” (internal citation omitted)). 
265. See George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-Tort World?, 112 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 175, 183 (2007) (discussing the creation of the fund).  In certain exceptional situations, effi-
ciency has become more important than accuracy in determining damages.  Particularly in times 
of national crisis and times in which voluminous tort actions result from one event, efficiency 
dominates when measuring damages. Id.  For example, after the events of September 11, 2001, 
Congress created the “September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001” through the enact-
ment of the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA).  The Act is codi-
fied in 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006). Id.  The Act provided for noneconomic losses, and defined 
“noneconomic” broadly to including pain and suffering, disfigurement, impairment, mental an-
guish, loss of society and consortium, hedonic damages, injury to reputation and “all other nonpe-
cuniary losses of any kind or nature.” Id. at 184 n.34.  The Act set the minimum presumptive 
award at $250,000 for each death.  Id. at 184.  It guaranteed an additional $50,000 for each de-
pendent. Id.  Consistency was sufficiently important in this case that victims need to show special 
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Third, another counter argument may be that the individuated approach 
of the proposed post-death evidence rule is too context-specific and lacks 
coherence.  Those that seek greater coherence will likely argue that plain-
tiffs should not receive noneconomic damages in wrongful death actions.  
They would contend that noneconomic damages create greater variability in 
wrongful death awards, and as such, are unfavorable.  This argument strains 
credulity.  The history of the wrongful death system is replete with in-
stances in which courts have sought to alleviate the injustices that the fail-
ure to award noneconomic damages creates.266  Denying recovery for none-
conomic damages today would only recreate that injustice.  Proponents of 
greater coherence might also argue that measurement of loss of society 
damages should not be modified and that no post-death evidence should be 
used to measure that loss of society.  However, preserving loss of society 
damages as measured currently actually does nothing to achieve greater co-
herence in wrongful death damages.  Loss of society damages are still 
measured using individual-specific evidence.  Considering an even greater 
amount of evidence does not make the inquiry less consistent.  The pro-
posed post-death evidence rule simply makes the inquiry more nuanced. 
Proponents of greater coherence, including this author, would be best 
served to seek coherence in wrongful death damages through other meth-
ods.  For example, Professors Posner and Sunstein argue that in a wrongful 
death action, instead of paying lost income, the tortfeasor should pay the 
value that the victim is willing to pay to avoid the risk that was imposed on 
him by the tortfeasor’s conduct, divided by that risk.267  This value will be 
relatively similar across the board, with adjustments reflecting individual 
factors such as the defendant’s risk preference, life expectancy, wealth, and 
quality of life.268  This approach provides a great deal of coherence in the 
wrongful death system, but still allows additional recovery of the harm 
done to survivors, i.e. their welfare loss for grief, mental distress, and loss 
 
circumstances to depart from the norm. Id.  Non-national crisis situations, even when tort claims 
could inundate the system and impede the functioning of the courts, however, should not qualify 
for such fixed-sum damages.  Because deterrence remains a goal of the tort system, efficiency 
cannot trump accuracy; it must be balanced with accuracy.  Posner & Sunstein, supra note 38, at 
548-49. 
266. See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.  For example, the lives of children had a 
negative net worth because the cost of rearing a child exceeded the monetary value and service 
contributions that children make to their families.  Selders v. Armentrout, 207 N.W.2d 686, 688-
89 (Neb. 1973) (noting that “if the rule was literally followed, the average child would have nega-
tive worth”).  In addition, men’s lives were generally worth more than women’s lives under that 
wrongful death system because men continued to earn more in our society.  McClurg, supra note 
19, at 20-22; see also Genaro C. Armas, In Most Jobs, It Pays to be a Man, MIAMI HERALD, June 
4, 2004, at F1, available at 2004 WL 79853670. 
267. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 38, at 566-68. 
268. Id. at 587. 
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of companionship.269  Thus, the argument for greater coherence in wrongful 
death damages lacks weight in its claim against the proposed post-death 
evidence rule. 
All things said, although several objections to an individuated tort sys-
tem exist and the debate continues, the law calls for a highly individuated 
approach.270  The proposed post-death evidence rule is consistent with this 
approach and provides an even more nuanced method for measuring loss of 
society damages.  Furthermore, it does so while efficiently providing max-
imum deterrence and just compensation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A compelling need exists to adopt an approach for determining admis-
sibility of post-death evidence that provides a clearer framework for the 
courts.271  The law in this area is disjointed and lacks clarity.272  Neither the 
exclusionary rule nor the grief and suffering rule apply to post-death evi-
dence.273  Although the exclusionary rule provides ample justification for 
excluding evidence of remarriage, engagement to remarry, post-death af-
fairs, and death benefits such as social security benefits or property re-
ceived, post-death evidence of the death’s effects on the beneficiaries, as it 
goes to loss of society, is not excluded under the rule.274  Furthermore, the 
grief and suffering rule does not bar post-death evidence because it does not 
relate to a separate award for grief and suffering; rather, it relates to deter-
mining the damages for loss of society.275 
The California statute that governs wrongful death law provides that 
“in an action under this article, damages may be awarded that, under all the 
circumstances of the case, may be just . . . .”276  Courts should adopt a 
framework for considering the admissibility of post-death evidence that 
comports with the tort system’s notions of justice and fair compensation.277  
First, courts should generally admit all post-death evidence that is relevant 
to determine loss of society damages.  Second, three exceptions to this rule 
should be articulated.  The first exception is the collateral source exception: 
the defendant may not use post-death evidence to benefit from his or her 
 
269. Id. at 590. 
270. Id. at 548-49. 
271. See discussion supra Parts I, II, and VI.A. 
272. See discussion supra Parts IV, V, and VI.A. 
273. See discussion supra Parts IV and V. 
274. See discussion supra Part IV. 
275. See discussion supra Part V. 
276. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.61 (1991) (emphasis added). 
277. See discussion supra Part VI.C. 
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tortious conduct.  The second exception is the speculation exception: if the 
defendant offers evidence to mitigate damages and that evidence requires 
the fact-finder to speculatively compare the replacement of the benefici-
ary’s loss, the evidence is inadmissible.  The third exception is the grief and 
suffering exception: if the fact-finder is considering post-death evidence re-
lated to the grief and suffering of the beneficiaries, courts should apply a 
balancing test and should not admit the evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.  This is precisely the type of 
rule that will be “more in consonance with justice.” 278 
Additionally, the proposed post-death evidence rule offers a nuanced 
and individuated approach because it examines many personal factors and 
considers the result to the complainant in depth.279  This is the most accu-
rate method to measure noneconomic wrongful death damages.  As such, it 
achieves optimal deterrence and full compensation in an already context-
specific tort system using the most efficient means possible.280 
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